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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
No. 14-4183 
HANOVER 3201 REALTY, LLC, 
   Appellant 
v. 
VILLAGE SUPERMARKETS, INC.; ABC 
CORPORATIONS 1-10 (names being fictitious and unknown 
but described as those corporations associated with Village 
that assisted with and promoted the use of sham litigations 
and anti-competitive acts); JOHN DOES 1-10 (names being 
fictitious and unknown but described as those individuals 
associated with Village that assisted with and promoted the 
use of sham litigations and anti-competitive acts); 
HANOVER AND HORSEHILL DEVELOPMENT LLC 
_____________ 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civ. No. 2-14-cv-01327) 
District Judge: Honorable Stanley R. Chesler 
_____________ 
Argued: June 18, 2015 
Before: AMBRO, FUENTES, and GREENBERG, Circuit 
Judges 
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John M. Agnello, Esq. 
James E. Cecchi, Esq. 
Lindsey H. Taylor, Esq.  [ARGUED] 
Carella Byrne Cecchi Olstein Brody & Agnello 
5 Becker Farm Road 
Roseland, NJ 07068 
   
Attorneys for Appellant, Hanover 3201 Realty, LLC 
 
Anthony Argiropoulos, Esq.  [ARGUED] 
Thomas Kane, Esq. 
Epstein Becker & Green 
One Gateway Center 
Newark, NJ 07102 
 
David W. Fassett, Esq. 
Arseneault & Fassett 
560 Main Street 
Chatham, NJ 07928   
 
Attorneys for Appellees, Village Supermarkets, Inc. and 
Hanover and Horsehill Development LLC 
 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge, with whom AMBRO, Circuit 
Judge, joins as to Parts II.A.2, II.B, and II.C, and 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge, joins as to Part II.A.  
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Hanover 3201 Realty, LLC (“Hanover Realty”) signed 
a contract with Wegmans to develop a supermarket on its 
property in Hanover, New Jersey.  The agreement required 
Hanover Realty to secure all necessary governmental permits 
and approvals prior to breaking ground.  Village 
Supermarkets, Inc. (“ShopRite”) owns the local ShopRite.  
Once ShopRite and its subsidiary Hanover and Horsehill 
Development LLC (“H&H Development”) (collectively, 
“Defendants”) caught wind that Wegmans might be entering 
the market, they filed numerous administrative and court 
challenges to Hanover Realty’s permit applications.  
Believing these filings were baseless and intended only to 
frustrate the entry of a competitor, Hanover Realty sued 
Defendants for antitrust violations.  Hanover Realty alleged 
that Defendants attempted to restrain the market for full-
service supermarkets as well as the market for full-service 
supermarket rental space.  The District Court dismissed the 
suit, holding that Hanover Realty did not have antitrust 
standing because it was the wrong plaintiff—it was not a 
competitor, consumer, or participant in the restrained markets 
and thus did not sustain the type of injury the antitrust laws 
were intended to prevent. 1   
 
We conclude that, with respect to the claim for 
attempted monopolization of the market for full-service 
supermarkets, the District Court took too narrow a view of 
antitrust injury.  Hanover Realty can establish that its injury 
                                              
1 For the reasons set forth in Part III of Judge Ambro’s partial 
concurrence, I agree with Judge Ambro’s decision to use an 
“issue voting” approach to determine the outcome of the 
judgment in this case.  
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was “inextricably intertwined” with Defendants’ 
anticompetitive conduct.  However, as to the claim for 
attempted monopolization of the market for rental space, the 
District Court correctly found no standing because Hanover 
Realty does not compete with Defendants in that market.  We 
also hold that Hanover Realty has sufficiently alleged that the 
petitioning activity here was undertaken without regard to the 
merits of the claims and for the purpose of using the 
governmental process to restrain trade.  As such, Hanover 
Realty can demonstrate that Defendants are not protected by 
Noerr-Pennington immunity because their conduct falls 
within the exception for sham litigation.  Accordingly, we 
will affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand to the District 
Court for further proceedings. 
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I.  BACKGROUND 
 
 Plaintiff Hanover Realty is a real estate developer and 
the owner of a plot of land in Hanover, New Jersey.2  In July 
2012, Hanover Realty entered into a lease and site-
development agreement with Wegmans for the purpose of 
constructing a “full-service supermarket.”  App. 66.  These 
types of supermarkets, in contrast to their local grocery store 
counterparts, provide customers with a “one-stop shopping” 
experience.  App. 67.  Full-service supermarkets supply not 
only traditional groceries, but also additional amenities, 
including prepared foods to go, on-site dining options, wine 
and liquor, specialty products, and other services such as 
pharmacies, banks, and fitness centers.  The site-development 
agreement placed the burden on Hanover Realty to obtain all 
necessary governmental permits prior to beginning 
construction.  If Hanover Realty was unable to secure the 
required permits within two years of the agreement, 
Wegmans could walk away from the deal. 
 
 Defendant ShopRite is the proprietor of 26 ShopRite 
supermarkets in New Jersey, including a ShopRite in Hanover 
that is about two miles away from the site of the proposed 
Wegmans.  The ShopRite opened in November 2013 and 
replaced the previous one in Morris Plains, which has since 
closed.  Defendant H&H Development, a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of ShopRite, owns the property on which the 
Hanover ShopRite sits, and leases the land or building to 
                                              
2 Unless otherwise indicated, the facts are taken from the 
amended complaint, documents relied upon in that complaint, 
and matters of public record.  See Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 
241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014).   
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ShopRite.  ShopRite and H&H Development have the same 
decision makers.  Hanover Realty alleges that the ShopRite in 
Hanover is the only full-service supermarket operating in the 
greater Morristown area.   
 
 Once news broke that Wegmans was coming to town, 
Defendants launched a petitioning campaign designed to 
block Hanover Realty from obtaining the permits and 
approvals it needed to proceed with the project.  We describe 
these filings here. 
 
 First, Hanover Realty applied for a Flood Hazard Area 
Permit (“Flood Permit”) from the New Jersey Department of 
Environmental Protection (“Environmental Department”).  
After Hanover Realty received the permit, ShopRite (on 
behalf of itself and H&H Development) submitted an appeal 
to the Environmental Department requesting an adjudicatory 
hearing and seeking an order that would vacate the permit.  
Defendants asserted that they had standing to bring the appeal 
because the then-existing ShopRite in Morris Plains would be 
“detrimentally impacted” by the competition from the 
Wegmans.  App. 74.  Over the next five months, Defendants 
submitted additional documents to the Environmental 
Department, including an objection that Hanover Realty 
failed to comply with relevant notice requirements and an 
amended request for an adjudicatory hearing. 
 
 About a month after Hanover Realty filed its amended 
complaint in this action, the Environmental Department 
issued an order denying Defendants’ request for a hearing.  It 
first found that ShopRite had no standing, explaining that 
“[c]ourts have consistently held that proximity or any type of 
generalized property right shared with other property owners 
such as recreational interests, traffic, views, quality of life, 
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and property values are insufficient to demonstrate a 
particularized property right required to establish third party 
standing for a hearing.”  App. 157.  ShopRite’s “generalized 
property rights” and its claim of “greater competition” from 
the proposed Wegmans were not enough to show that it was 
an aggrieved party.  The Environmental Department also 
evaluated the substance of Defendants’ arguments and found 
them without merit. 
 
 Second, Hanover Realty submitted a multi-permit 
application to the Environmental Department seeking various 
wetlands approvals (“Wetlands Permit”) for the Wegmans 
project.  An ecological consulting firm sent a letter to the 
Environmental Department on behalf of Defendants raising 
various challenges to this permit.  One objection was that 
Hanover Realty’s notice to neighboring landowners was 
“technically deficient.”  App. 77.  In response to this 
objection, and as “required” by the Environmental 
Department, Hanover Realty corrected this “administrative 
error” the next week and submitted a revised application.  
App. 169.  The ecological consultant also voiced its concern 
that the site of the proposed Wegmans was a potentially 
suitable habitat for certain endangered species, including the 
Indiana bat.3  A few days later, Defendants submitted another 
letter to the Environmental Department, this time requesting a 
meeting to discuss the Wetlands Permit and “strongly 
                                              
3 Indiana bats may be found over a broad swath of the United 
States, including New Jersey.  But true to name, half of this 
bat population does, in fact, hibernate in Indiana.  See Indiana 
Bat Fact Sheet, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, 
http://www.fws.gov/midwest/endangered/mammals/inba/inba
fctsht.html (last visited Aug. 13, 2015). 
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urg[ing]” it to “diligently and prudently” review the permit 
and not act with “haste” in granting approval.  App. 78.  In 
the following months, Defendants’ ecological consultant 
complained to the United States Fish and Wildlife Service 
about the Wetlands Permit.  In one email to the Wildlife 
Service, the consulting firm praised itself for “manag[ing] to 
delay the issuance of the [Wetlands] approvals based on a 
technicality” and said that its substantive objections “may 
delay things a bit longer.”  App. 80.  Hanover Realty 
responded to Defendants’ multifaceted challenge with its own 
submissions, explaining why, in its view, each objection was 
unsubstantiated.  Moreover, Hanover Realty alleges that 
Defendants knew the wetlands at issue are not federally 
regulated waters, but nonetheless contacted the Wildlife 
Service to add friction to the review process.  
  
 The Environmental Department issued Hanover Realty 
its requested Wetlands Permit, subject to various conditions.  
One such condition required Hanover Realty to conduct a 
survey for the presence of Indiana bats prior to construction.4  
After the Environmental Department issued the permit, 
Defendants submitted a request for an adjudicatory hearing to 
challenge the approval.5   
 
 Third, the tract of land owned by Hanover Realty has 
been the subject of several contracts and sales over the years, 
                                              
4 In its appellate brief, Hanover Realty informs us that it 
conducted the Indiana bat survey and no bats were found. 
5 In a supplemental letter filed with the Court, Hanover Realty 
says that, in June 2015, the Environmental Department denied 
Defendants’ request for a hearing. 
 9 
 
including a four-phased developer’s agreement with the New 
Jersey Department of Transportation that dates back to 1978.  
Under that agreement, the owner of the land must make 
certain road improvements as it reaches various phases of 
development.  Hanover Realty believed the Wegmans project 
would trigger Phase III of the agreement.  Consistent with 
that understanding, Hanover Realty submitted an application 
for a Major Street Intersection Permit (“Street Permit”) to the 
Department of Transportation in which it proposed 
improvements to a nearby intersection in connection with the 
Wegmans project.  Defendants submitted a letter objecting to 
the application, and then proceeded to file a number of open 
public records requests seeking additional information upon 
which they could contest the application.  Defendants then 
sent another letter to the Department of Transportation 
informing it that the Wegmans project would trigger Phase IV 
of the developer’s agreement.  As a result, Defendants said, 
Hanover Realty was required to build an overpass over a 
nearby highway before it could proceed any further.  Hanover 
Realty and its traffic engineering consultant submitted letters 
of their own, explaining that the Phase IV requirements 
(including the overpass) were not implicated by the Wegmans 
project.  Hanover Realty alleges that Defendants knew the 
Phase IV obligations were not triggered because their counsel 
had negotiated the developer’s agreement. 
 
 The Department of Transportation issued a letter 
responding to the parties’ various submissions relating to the 
Street Permit application.  The letter began by acknowledging 
that the Department of Transportation is “required to consider 
any relevant data, analysis, and arguments submitted by third 
parties.”  App. 165.  It then agreed with Defendants that the 
proposed development would generate traffic at certain hours 
that would exceed the level of traffic contemplated by Phases 
 10 
 
I, II, and III of the developer’s agreement.  Moreover, 
although it did not specifically mention the overpass or 
whether Phase IV obligations would be implicated, the 
Department of Transportation said the Wegmans project 
“would trigger the need for additional highway improvements 
as stipulated in the [developer’s] agreement.”  App. 167.  It 
noted, however, that the “improvements may no longer be 
appropriate or feasible” and therefore recommended that 
Hanover Realty negotiate a modification to the agreement 
with the Department of Transportation.  App. 167.6 
 
 Fourth, in mid-2012, Hanover Realty applied to the 
Hanover Township Committee to rezone the property of the 
proposed Wegmans so that it could be used for retail space.  
The next summer, Hanover Realty received approval of its 
final site plan and request for a bulk variance.  Defendants did 
not lodge any objections during that year-long process.  
Instead, in August 2013, ShopRite (on behalf of itself and 
H&H Development) filed an action in lieu of prerogative 
writs in New Jersey state court seeking to nullify the 
approval.  Over the next several months, Defendants filed 
three amended complaints, which Hanover Realty alleges 
were filed for the purpose of delay.  
 
 In June 2014, after Hanover Realty had filed its 
amended complaint in the present litigation, the Superior 
Court of New Jersey issued an order dismissing the 
prerogative writs action.  The court found that ShopRite was 
                                              
6 Hanover Realty informs us in a letter that, after 
renegotiating the developer’s agreement and otherwise 
revising its proposal, the Department of Transportation issued 
the Street Permit in April 2015. 
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not an “interested party” because it failed to allege facts 
suggesting its “right to use, acquire, or enjoy either of its 
nearby properties” would be affected by the approval of 
Hanover Realty’s site plan.  App. 136.  In addition, the court 
rejected ShopRite’s argument that it had standing based on its 
status as a local taxpayer.  After ruling against ShopRite on 
the standing issue, the court also addressed and disposed of 
ShopRite’s arguments on the merits. 
 
 Frustrated by Defendants’ many legal challenges, 
Hanover Realty sued Defendants in federal court.  In its 
amended complaint, Hanover Realty alleges that Defendants’ 
administrative objections and state-court suit were mere 
anticompetitive shams designed to keep Wegmans out of the 
market.  Specifically, it asserts claims under Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act for attempted monopolization of and conspiracy 
to monopolize the greater Morristown full-service 
supermarket market (Count One) and the greater Morristown 
full-service supermarket shopping center market, which it 
describes as the market for supermarket rental space (Count 
Two).  The amended complaint also contains five-state law 
claims. 
 
 Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for four 
independent reasons.  The District Court found the threshold 
issue of antitrust standing dispositive and dismissed the 
complaint on that ground.  It observed that, as a general 
matter, plaintiffs in antitrust suits must be either consumers or 
competitors of the defendant in the restrained market—here, 
the markets for supermarkets and supermarket rental space.  
Hanover Realty was neither a consumer nor competitor of 
Defendants in either market.  The District Court 
acknowledged the limited exception to the 
consumer/competitor requirement for persons whose injuries 
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are “inextricably intertwined” with the harm caused by 
defendants.  But it found Hanover Realty did not fit within 
that narrow exception either.  As a result, Hanover Realty had 
suffered no antitrust injury and thus had no antitrust standing 
to pursue its Sherman Act claims.7  Without a federal claim in 
play, the District Court declined to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over the state-law claims.  Hanover Realty 
appealed.8 
II. DISCUSSION 
 
 Defendants raise four arguments in support of the 
District Court’s order:  (1) Hanover Realty does not have 
antitrust standing; (2) Defendants’ petitioning activity was 
protected by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine; (3) Hanover 
Realty has not sufficiently alleged that there is a dangerous 
probability of Defendants achieving monopoly power; and 
(4) Hanover Realty has failed to plead a specific intent to 
monopolize. 
                                              
7 The District Court also dismissed the parts of Counts One 
and Two that assert a conspiracy to violate the Sherman Act 
because Hanover Realty failed to allege the particulars of this 
conspiracy.  As Hanover Realty does not challenge this 
finding on appeal, we affirm the dismissal of Counts One and 
Two to the extent they contain conspiracy claims. 
8 The District Court had jurisdiction under 15 U.S.C. § 15 and 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367, and we have jurisdiction to 
review the District Court’s final order under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  We review de novo a district court’s grant of a 
motion to dismiss and construe all facts in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party.  See Rea v. Federated 
Investors, 627 F.3d 937, 940 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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 A. Antitrust Standing 
 
 We begin with antitrust standing.  Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act prohibits any attempt to monopolize.  15 U.S.C. 
§ 2.  Section 4 of the Clayton Act, in turn, defines the class of 
persons who may bring a private antitrust suit as “any person” 
who is injured “by reason of anything” prohibited by the 
antitrust laws.  Id. § 15(a).  This extraordinarily broad 
language reflects the Clayton Act’s remedial purpose and 
Congress’s intent to “create a private enforcement mechanism 
that would deter violators and deprive them of the fruits of 
their illegal actions, and would provide ample compensation 
to the victims of antitrust violations.”  Blue Shield of Va. v. 
McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982).  Emphasizing § 4’s 
expansive reach, the Supreme Court has explained that the 
“statute does not confine its protection to consumers, or to 
purchasers, or to competitors, or to sellers. . . .  The Act is 
comprehensive in its terms and coverage, protecting all who 
are made victims of the forbidden practices by whomever 
they may be perpetrated.”  Id. (quoting Mandeville Island 
Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236 
(1948)).  
 
 Although a literal reading of § 4’s grant of authority to 
sue arguably is limited only by the minimal requirements of 
constitutional standing, the Supreme Court has interpreted 
this provision more restrictively than that.  See Hawaii v. 
Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 262 n.14 (1972) 
(“Congress did not intend the antitrust laws to provide a 
remedy in damages for all injuries that might conceivably be 
traced to an antitrust violation.”).  Thus, even when there is a 
clear violation of the antitrust laws, § 4 allows only a “proper 
plaintiff” to bring a private suit to remedy that violation.  See 
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Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State 
Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 544 (1983).  In other 
words, only certain plaintiffs have “antitrust standing.”  Id. at 
535 n.31.  In describing how to undertake the antitrust 
standing inquiry, the Supreme Court has warned that, because 
of the “infinite variety of claims” that may arise under § 4, a 
“black-letter rule” cannot dictate the result in every case.  Id. 
at 536.  Instead, the Court has articulated several guideposts.  
See id. at 536-57.  We have distilled these antitrust standing 
factors as follows:   
 
(1) the causal connection between the antitrust 
violation and the harm to the plaintiff and the 
intent by the defendant to cause that harm, with 
neither factor alone conferring standing; (2) 
whether the plaintiff’s alleged injury is of the 
type for which the antitrust laws were intended 
to provide redress; (3) the directness of the 
injury, which addresses the concerns that liberal 
application of standing principles might 
produce speculative claims; (4) the existence of 
more direct victims of the alleged antitrust 
violations; and (5) the potential for duplicative 
recovery or complex apportionment of 
damages.   
 
In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d 
1144, 1165-66 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Associated Gen., 459 
U.S. at 545).  Although we weigh these factors together on a 
case-by-case basis, the second factor, antitrust injury, “is a 
necessary but insufficient condition of antitrust standing.”  
Barton & Pittinos, Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 118 
F.3d 178, 182 (3d Cir. 1997). 
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 Antitrust injury has proven difficult to define and 
apply.  The Supreme Court has described it as “injury of the 
type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows 
from that which makes defendants’ acts unlawful.”  
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 
489 (1977).  In evaluating the nature of a plaintiff’s injury, 
the Supreme Court instructs us to keep in mind that “the 
Sherman Act was enacted to assure customers the benefits of 
price competition” and “protect[] the economic freedom of 
participants in the relevant market.”  Associated Gen., 459 
U.S. at 538.  Based on these principles, we have said that, 
“[a]s a general matter, the class of plaintiffs capable of 
satisfying the antitrust-injury requirement is limited to 
consumers and competitors in the restrained market . . . and to 
those whose injuries are the means by which the defendants 
seek to achieve their anticompetitive ends.”  W. Penn 
Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 102 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (citing cases).  As Hanover Realty offers distinct 
theories of injury for each of its attempted monopolization 
claims—one for the market for full-service supermarkets 
(Count One) and another for the market for full-service 
supermarket rental space (Count Two)—we discuss these 
claims separately. 
  1. Full-Service Supermarkets 
 
 Hanover Realty admits it is neither a competitor nor a 
consumer in the market for full-service supermarkets; it is a 
land owner and lessor of property, not a food retailer.  It 
instead argues that its injuries were “inextricably intertwined” 
with Defendants’ attempt to monopolize that market.  
 
 The Supreme Court first recognized this form of 
antitrust injury in McCready.  McCready was an employee 
covered by a group health plan purchased from the defendant 
 16 
 
Blue Shield.  McCready, 457 U.S. at 468.  Under the plan, 
Blue Shield agreed to reimburse subscribers such as 
McCready for services provided by psychiatrists, but not by 
psychologists.  McCready was treated by a psychologist and 
sought reimbursement for her bills, but Blue Shield denied 
payment.  She then filed suit against Blue Shield and a 
psychiatric society alleging that the two had engaged in an 
unlawful antitrust conspiracy to exclude psychologists from 
receiving payment under the Blue Shield plan.  Id. at 469.  
The defendants argued that McCready had not suffered 
antitrust injury because the alleged conspiracy was directed at 
psychologists and not at subscribers of group health plans.  
Id. at 478.  The Supreme Court rejected the defendants’ view 
of antitrust standing, explaining that the § 4 “remedy cannot 
reasonably be restricted to those competitors whom the 
conspirators hoped to eliminate from the market.”  Id. at 479.  
Although McCready was not a competitor of the defendants, 
“the injury she suffered was inextricably intertwined with the 
injury the conspirators sought to inflict on psychologists and 
the psychotherapy market.”  Id. at 483-84 (emphasis added).  
And while McCready was a consumer in the market for 
psychotherapy services, the Supreme Court’s explanation of 
why she suffered antitrust injury emphasized not her status as 
a market participant, but rather that she was directly targeted 
for harm by parties ultimately wishing to inflict a derivative 
harm on a competitor.  As the Court noted, “[d]enying 
reimbursement to subscribers for the cost of treatment was the 
very means by which it is alleged that Blue Shield sought to 
achieve its illegal ends.”  Id. at 479.  The harm to subscribers 
like McCready was not only clearly foreseeable, “it was a 
necessary step in effecting the ends of the alleged illegal 
conspiracy.”  Id.   
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 Underscoring that its reasoning was not limited to 
consumers, the Court offered the following hypothetical to 
crystalize the nature of McCready’s injury:  “If a group of 
psychiatrists conspired to boycott a bank until the bank 
ceased making loans to psychologists, the bank would no 
doubt be able to recover the injuries suffered as a 
consequence of the psychiatrists’ actions.”  Id. at 484 n.21.  
McCready and the bank “are in many respects similarly 
situated,” the Court explained, even though the bank is not a 
customer or consumer in the psychotherapy market.  See id.  
Both were used as conduits to harm the defendants’ actual 
competitors.  Because imposing harm on McCready was an 
indispensable aspect of the scheme, the Court concluded that 
the injury to McCready  
“reflect[ed] Congress’ core concerns” in prohibiting the 
defendants’ conduct.  Id. at 481. 
 
 In contrast to McCready, where the alleged harm to the 
plaintiff was the primary means of the defendants’ 
anticompetitive conduct, harm that is secondary to the 
anticompetitive conduct cannot support antitrust injury.  For 
example, we have said that, “[a]lthough a supplier may lose 
business when competition is restrained in the downstream 
market in which it sells goods and services, such losses are 
merely byproducts of the anticompetitive effects of the 
restraint,” and do not qualify as antitrust injury.  W. Penn 
Allegheny, 627 F.3d at 102.  To illustrate, in Ethypharm S.A. 
France v. Abbott Laboratories, 707 F.3d 223, 225-26 (3d Cir. 
2013), a foreign drug manufacturer, Ethypharm, used a 
domestic distributor to sell one of its drugs in the United 
States market.  After Abbott, the distributor of another drug, 
sued the domestic distributor for patent infringement, 
Ethypharm sued Abbott for antitrust violations.  We rejected 
the notion that Ethypharm’s injury was inextricably 
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intertwined with the alleged scheme.  See id. at 237.  To 
effectuate its conspiracy, Abbott needed only to place 
restrictions on Ethypharm’s domestic distributor and thus any 
harm suffered by Ethypharm was incidental, rather than 
essential, to the restraint on trade.  See id. at 233.  Similarly, 
in Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm, Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 319-20 
(3d Cir. 2007), the plaintiff’s asserted basis for antitrust 
standing was that the defendant’s restraint in one market 
injured it by suppressing the demand of participants in the 
restrained market for the plaintiff’s supply of goods in 
another market.  As in Ethypharm, we said the alleged injury 
was not inextricably intertwined with the anticompetitive 
scheme because it crossed markets and was attenuated from 
the anticompetitive conduct.  See id. at 320-21.  Together, 
Ethypharm and Broadcom support the proposition that 
suppliers and other non-market participants generally do not 
have antitrust standing unless their injuries were the very 
means by which the defendants carried out their illegal ends.  
As we said in West Penn Allegheny, “[a]s a general matter, 
the class of plaintiffs capable of satisfying the antitrust-injury 
requirement is limited to consumers and competitors in the 
restrained market . . . and to those whose injuries are the 
means by which the defendants seek to achieve their 
anticompetitive ends.”  627 F.3d at 102 (emphasis added). 
 
 Because Hanover Realty alleges that its harm was the 
essential component of Defendants’ anticompetitive scheme 
as opposed to an ancillary byproduct of it, we conclude that 
Hanover Realty has sufficiently pleaded antitrust injury under 
McCready.  The ultimate objective of the defendants in 
McCready was to injure psychologists, not plan subscribers.  
To achieve that goal, they refused to reimburse subscribers 
for visits to psychologists, thereby encouraging subscribers to 
visit psychiatrists.  Without injuring those subscribers, there 
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was no conspiracy.  Likewise, McCready’s hypothetical bank, 
which was neither a consumer nor competitor in the 
psychotherapy market, sustained actionable injury because it 
was directly harmed as the means of injuring psychologists. 
 
 Similar reasoning applies here.  The end goal of 
Defendants’ alleged anticompetitive conduct was to injure 
Wegmans, a prospective competitor.  To keep Wegmans out 
of the market, Defendants sought to impose costs not on their 
competitor, but on Hanover Realty, the party tasked with 
obtaining the necessary permits before construction could 
begin.  Absent this relationship between Hanover Realty and 
Wegmans, Defendants’ conduct “would have been without 
purpose or effect.”  Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare 
Fund v. Philips Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d 912, 923 (3d Cir. 
1999).  And Defendants would succeed in their scheme either 
by inflicting such high costs on Hanover Realty that it was 
forced to abandon the project or by delaying the project long 
enough so that Wegmans would back out of the agreement.  
In both scenarios, injuring Hanover Realty was the very 
means by which Defendants could get to Wegmans; Hanover 
Realty’s injury was necessary to Defendants’ plan.   
 
 Had Wegmans purchased the property from Hanover 
Realty and itself applied for the permits, the costs imposed by 
Defendants’ challenges would have qualified as antitrust 
injuries.  It should make no difference that the parties’ lease 
shifted these costs to Hanover Realty.  See McCready, 457 
U.S. at 479 (observing that antitrust injury “cannot reasonably 
be restricted to those competitors whom [defendants] hoped 
to eliminate from the market”).  Regardless of who bore these 
costs, Defendants’ objective remained the same:  to keep 
Wegmans out of the relevant market.   
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 Defendants seize on language from our precedent 
saying “we have not extended the ‘inextricably intertwined 
exception beyond cases in which both plaintiffs and 
defendants are in the business of selling goods or services in 
the same relevant market,’ though they may not directly 
compete against each other.”  See Ethypharm, 707 F.3d at 237 
(quoting Broadcom, 501 F.3d at 320-21).  According to 
Defendants, because Hanover Realty and ShopRite do not 
operate in the same market, “Hanover Realty cannot establish 
antitrust injury unless the Court were to break with 
Ethypharm and Broadcom and greatly expand the scope of 
the ‘inextricably intertwined’ exception—an expansion that 
would swallow the rule.”  Appellees’ Br. at 19. 
 
 Defendants read too much into these statements.9  As 
                                              
9 We pause to note that at least one of our cases discussing 
antitrust injury contains language that is potentially 
overstated.  In Barton & Pittinos, without mentioning the 
“inextricably intertwined” doctrine, we found no antitrust 
injury because the plaintiff was “not a competitor or a 
consumer in the market in which trade was allegedly 
restrained.”  118 F.3d at 184.  We later cast doubt on that 
statement, clarifying that the conclusion in Barton, “if 
construed as an absolute (which arguably it need not be), may 
in some circumstances lead to results that conflict with 
Supreme Court and other precedent.”  Carpet Grp. Int’l v. 
Oriental Rug Importers Ass’n, Inc., 227 F.3d 62, 76 (3d Cir. 
2000), overruled on other grounds, Animal Science Prods., 
Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2011).  
We, of course, agree with Carpet Group and our other cases 
that have allowed for the possibility of antitrust injury based 
on a showing of harm that is inextricably intertwined with the 
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an initial matter, just because we have not extended the 
exception beyond parties that sell goods or services in the 
same market by no means suggests we shouldn’t (or can’t ) 
do so.  In fact, McCready suggests the opposite conclusion.  
McCready did not sell goods or services in the psychotherapy 
market—she was a subscriber to a health insurance plan.  Nor 
was the hypothetical bank in McCready even a participant in 
the psychotherapy market.  Nonetheless, both sustained harm 
that was inextricably intertwined with the defendants’ 
misconduct.  Because § 4 “does not confine its protection to 
consumers, or to purchasers, or to competitors, or to sellers” 
we must avoid placing artificial limits on who may bring suit 
under the antitrust laws.  McCready, 457 U.S. at 472 
(citations omitted).  Moreover, our comments in Ethypharm 
and Broadcom must be read in context.  As we discussed, the 
alleged injuries to the plaintiffs in those cases were 
byproducts of anticompetitive restraints in separate markets.  
In contrast, although Hanover Realty and ShopRite operate in 
separate markets, the very essence of Defendants’ scheme 
was to impose expense and delay on Hanover Realty as a 
means of keeping Wegmans out of the relevant market. 
 
  Defendants’ final line of defense against a finding of 
antitrust injury rests on cases from other jurisdictions.  In an 
industry notorious for low profit margins, perhaps it is not 
surprising that this is just the latest in a series of cases in 
which a supermarket allegedly employed anticompetitive 
tactics to keep a competitor out of the market.10  Defendants 
                                                                                                     
defendant’s wrongdoing, rather than harm just to competitors 
or consumers. 
10 See, e.g., Serfecz v. Jewel Food Stores, 67 F.3d 591 (7th 
Cir. 1995); Southaven Land Co. v. Malone & Hyde, Inc., 715 
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rely mostly on the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Southaven Land 
Co. v. Malone & Hyde, Inc., 715 F.2d 1079. 
 
 Southaven was an owner-lessor of commercial space 
and Malone operated a number of grocery stores in the 
neighborhood.  Southaven, 715 F.2d at 1080.  Malone 
assumed a lease to premises owned by Southaven, but the 
parties later agreed to cancel the agreement.  However, upon 
learning that Southaven intended to find a grocery store to fill 
the vacancy, Malone refused to cancel the contract.  Malone 
continued to pay rent on the vacant lot and did not otherwise 
breach any of its contractual obligations.  Id. at 1087.  
Southaven nonetheless sued for antitrust violations, alleging 
that Malone intended to leave the space vacant so as to 
destroy competition for its other grocery stores.  The Sixth 
Circuit rejected Southaven’s argument that its injury was 
inextricably intertwined with the injury Malone sought to 
inflict on the grocery market.  Id. at 1086-87.  It explained 
that “Southaven [a real estate lessor] is not alleged to be a 
member of a class of ‘consumers’ of grocery products or a 
class otherwise manipulated or utilized by Malone as a 
fulcrum, conduit or market force to injure competitors or 
participants” in the relevant market.  Id. at 1086.  Rather, 
Southaven’s injury was, at most, a “tangential by-product” of 
the alleged monopolistic conduct.  Id. at 1086-87. 
 
 We do not find Southaven persuasive here because it 
addressed a different set of facts and a different kind of 
                                                                                                     
F.2d 1079 (6th Cir. 1983); Acme Mkts., Inc. v. Wharton 
Hardware & Supply Corp., 890 F. Supp. 1230 (D.N.J. 1995); 
Rosenberg v. Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, 598 F. 
Supp. 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
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injury.  Southaven’s only economic harm was the vague 
allegation that Malone was “subvert[ing] [its] business and 
financial interests.”  Id. at 1087.  This supposed subversion of 
business interests was not the means by which Malone was 
trying to achieve its illegal ends; it was an incidental effect in 
the real estate rental market rather than the grocery market.  
Indeed, by continuing to pay rent and honoring its contractual 
obligations, Malone arguably did not intend to harm 
Southaven at all.  As in Ethypharm and Broadcom, the 
alleged downstream harm was too attenuated to support 
antitrust injury.  In fact, Southaven supports the view that 
there was antitrust injury here, for Hanover Realty was used 
as the “fulcrum, conduit or market force” that was missing in 
Southaven.  Forcing Hanover Realty to pay thousands of 
dollars in legal fees to defend itself against alleged 
anticompetitive filings and imposing significant delays on the 
project were the very means by which Defendants sought to 
keep a competitor out of the market.11  For all these reasons, 
we conclude that Hanover Realty has sufficiently alleged 
antitrust injury in the market for full-service supermarkets 
because its injury was inextricably intertwined with 
Defendants’ monopolistic conduct.  
 
                                              
11 Defendants also urge us to follow Rosenberg, a decades-old 
district court decision from outside this circuit.  Although 
Rosenberg involved similar facts to those here—competitor 
supermarkets filing a series of lawsuits to enjoin the 
construction of a new supermarket—the court’s legal analysis 
is not persuasive.  See 598 F. Supp. at 643-44.  The court 
mechanically applied Southaven without even mentioning the 
possibility of antitrust injury based on the “inextricably 
intertwined” exception.  Id. at 645. 
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 In his dissent in part, Judge Ambro says that, in his 
view, a “plaintiff has not suffered antitrust injury unless its 
own harm stems from the anticompetitive consequences of 
the defendant’s conduct.”  Judge Ambro Op. at 3.  According 
to Judge Ambro, the plaintiff’s injury in McCready was 
actionable because she was a consumer in the psychotherapy 
market and Blue Shield “used a classic antitrust harm—
increased prices—as a fulcrum to distort” that market.  Id. at 
4.  Judge Ambro believes that McCready was “injured 
because of the anticompetitive effects” of Blue Shield’s 
conduct, but that Hanover Realty did not sustain a similar 
type of injury.  Id.  In our view, Judge Ambro’s analysis 
resembles that espoused by then-Justice Rehnquist in his 
dissent in McCready.  Justice Rehnquist said that McCready 
could not recover under the antitrust laws because she 
“alleges no anticompetitive effect upon herself”—her harm 
did not arise from an increase in price, decrease in availability 
of services, or reduction in competition.  McCready, 457 U.S. 
at 489 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 
 The majority agreed that McCready did not suffer one 
of these traditional forms of antitrust harm, but that did not 
foreclose relief.  See id. at 482-83.  She suffered antitrust 
injury because the harm imposed on her—denying 
reimbursement for visits to her psychologist—was the very 
means by which Blue Shield sought to harm psychologists.  
Similarly, Hanover Realty does not allege a classic antitrust 
harm, but it nonetheless sufficiently alleges antitrust injury 
because its harm was the very means by which Defendants 
sought to keep Wegmans out of the market.  Indeed, Hanover 
Realty was the immediate target and bore the costs of 
Defendants’ scheme. 
 
 Moving to the other four factors of the antitrust 
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standing analysis, we first find that Hanover Realty 
sufficiently alleges a causal connection between the antitrust 
violation and its harm.  Defendants’ alleged sham petitioning 
caused Hanover Realty to pay thousands of dollars in 
attorney’s fees and costs in filing its responses. 
 
 The next two factors are interrelated and go to the 
directness of the injury and the existence of more direct 
victims of the antitrust violations.  These both favor Hanover 
Realty as well.  Under McCready, a plaintiff can suffer direct 
injury even if the defendant’s anticompetitive conduct 
ultimately targets a third party; although the defendants there 
sought to harm competing psychologists and not the plaintiff 
health plan subscriber, the Supreme Court declared that the 
denial of reimbursement for those receiving treatment from 
psychologists injured the plaintiff “directly.”  457 U.S. at 483.  
Likewise, Defendants’ legal challenges directly injured 
Hanover Realty.  If Defendants’ attempt to prevent Wegmans 
from leasing the property fails, then Hanover Realty will have 
suffered the costs of responding to the legal challenges while 
Wegmans may have experienced no loss at all.  In addition, to 
the extent Defendants succeed in obstructing the lease, 
Hanover Realty’s loss of rent under the contract would result 
directly and not through “several somewhat vaguely defined 
links.”  Associated Gen., 459 U.S. at 540.  That Wegmans is 
another possible direct victim “does not diminish the 
directness of [Hanover Realty’s] injury.”  Lower Lake Erie, 
998 F.2d at 1168-69. 
 
 The final factor, the potential for duplicative recovery 
or complex apportionment of damages, also supports 
standing.  Hanover Realty’s recovery of the costs of 
responding to the legal challenges would not pose a risk “of 
overlapping damages as no other [party has] suffered this 
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distinct type of injury.”  Id. at 1164 n.11.  Furthermore, any 
damages awarded for the delay or obstruction of the lease 
would not yield duplicative recovery as the lost rent to 
Hanover Realty would have to be subtracted as a cost from 
any subsequent claim by Wegmans for lost profits.  See id. at 
1169 n.22.  Although this last scenario would require some 
apportionment of damages, the calculation would not be 
complex.   
 
 Accordingly, Hanover Realty has adequately alleged 
antitrust standing on its claim for attempted monopolization 
of the market for full-service supermarkets.  
 
  2. Full-Service Supermarket Shopping  
   Centers 
 
 Hanover Realty does not rely on the “inextricably 
intertwined” doctrine for its attempted monopolization claim 
concerning the market for full-service supermarket shopping 
centers.  Instead, Hanover Realty argues that it directly 
competes in this market for rental space with H&H 
Development, which owns the land on which the ShopRite 
resides.   
 
 Antitrust injury ordinarily is limited to consumers and 
competitors in the restrained market.  See Ethypharm, 707 
F.3d at 233.  If doubts arise as to whether the parties are 
competitors, we look to see whether “there is a cross-
elasticity of demand between the plaintiffs’ offering and the 
defendants’ offering.”  Carpet Grp., 227 F.3d at 77.  Such 
cross-elasticity exists where customers of the defendant 
would switch to the plaintiff if the defendant raised its prices.  
Id. at 77 n.13. 
 Hanover Realty argues that both it and H&H 
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Development compete in the marketplace for supermarket 
rental space because they “both operate an enterprise in it.”  
Appellant’s Br. at 44.  We are not persuaded.  According to 
Hanover Realty, H&H Development is a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of ShopRite; the two have the same decision 
makers; H&H Development owns no property other than the 
land on which the ShopRite sits; and H&H Development 
leases that property to its parent.  Hanover Realty fails to 
explain how it competes with H&H Development as a 
supermarket landlord in any meaningful way.  For example, it 
does not argue there is any cross-elasticity between Hanover 
Realty’s and H&H Development’s offerings.  If a traditional 
supermarket landlord raised rent to an excessive level, then 
the supermarket presumably would move its business to 
another property, such as Hanover Realty’s.  But why would 
H&H Development raise ShopRite’s rent given that they have 
the same decision makers?  As H&H Development’s sole 
purpose is to own the ShopRite property, Hanover Realty 
never alleges that H&H Development is competing for any 
tenants other than its parent—to the extent one can even call 
that “competing.”  Because Hanover Realty cannot establish 
antitrust injury in the market for full-service supermarket 
shopping centers, it has no standing to bring its attempted 
monopolization claim of this market.  Therefore, we affirm 
the dismissal of Count Two of the amended complaint. 
 
 B. Noerr-Pennington 
 
 Having survived (in part) the threshold issue of 
antitrust standing, we proceed to Hanover Realty’s next major 
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obstacle:  Noerr-Pennington immunity.12  The Noerr-
Pennington doctrine takes its name from a pair of Supreme 
Court cases that placed a First Amendment limitation on the 
reach of the Sherman Act.  See E. R.R. Presidents Conference 
v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); United 
Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).  
Noerr-Pennington provides broad immunity from liability to 
those who petition the government, including administrative 
agencies and courts, for redress of their grievances.  Cal. 
Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 
(1972).  Although Noerr-Pennington is a powerful shield, it is 
not absolute.  Noerr itself recognized “[t]here may be 
situations” in which a petition “is a mere sham to cover what 
is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly 
with the business relationships of a competitor and the 
application of the Sherman Act would be justified.”  Noerr, 
365 U.S. at 144.  And so spawned the “sham” exception. 
 
 Two Supreme Court cases have explored the contours 
of this exception.  In California Motor, the respondents, a 
group of highway carriers, alleged that the petitioners, 
another group of highway carriers, engaged in 
anticompetitive conduct by instituting state and federal 
proceedings to defeat the respondents’ applications for 
operating rights.  404 U.S. at 509.  The Court held that the 
                                              
12 Although the District Court did not discuss Noerr-
Pennington, we will address this issue in the first instance 
because it raises questions of law over which we exercise 
plenary review and has been fully briefed by the parties.  See 
Hudson United Bank v. LiTenda Mortg. Corp., 142 F.3d 151, 
159 (3d Cir. 1998).  The same goes for Defendants’ other 
arguments for dismissal, which we discuss further below.  
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complaint demonstrated a sham because it contained 
allegations that respondents “sought to bar their competitors 
from meaningful access to adjudicatory tribunals and . . . to 
usurp that decisionmaking process” by “institut[ing] the 
proceedings and actions . . . with or without probable cause, 
and regardless of the merits of the cases.”  Id. at 512 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  In other words, the allegations, if 
proven, showed that the “administrative and judicial 
processes have been abused.”  Id. at 513. 
 
 
 The Court returned to the exception in Professional 
Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, 
Inc., 508 U.S. 49 (1993).  There, after the respondents filed a 
single copyright suit against the petitioners, the petitioners 
responded with an antitrust action, dubbing the copyright suit 
a sham.  The Supreme Court outlined a two-part definition of 
sham litigation.  Id. at 60.  First, “the lawsuit must be 
objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant 
could realistically expect success on the merits.”  Id.  The 
existence of probable cause to institute the legal proceeding 
irrefutably demonstrates that the antitrust plaintiff has not 
proved the objective prong.  Id. at 63.  If the antitrust plaintiff 
fails to satisfy the objective prong, the analysis ends and the 
defendant is immune from suit.  Only if the underlying 
litigation is objectively meritless does the court address the 
second factor:  the litigant’s subjective motivations.  Id. at 60.  
Under this second part of the test, the court asks whether “the 
baseless lawsuit conceals an attempt to interfere directly with 
the business relationships of a competitor . . . through the use 
[of] the governmental process—as opposed to the outcome of 
that process—as an anticompetitive weapon.”  Id. at 60-61 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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 Following California Motor and Professional Real 
Estate, questions arise as to the relationship between these 
two cases.  Hanover Realty argues that, because Defendants 
filed a series of petitions without regard to merit, its 
allegations are in line with those from California Motor.  
Defendants respond by pointing to the Supreme Court’s more 
recent two-step analysis in Professional Real Estate, arguing 
that we must find each petition objectively baseless before 
assessing Defendants’ subjective motivations.13 
 
 Three other Courts of Appeals have reconciled 
                                              
13 Defendants maintain that Hanover Realty waived its 
argument regarding applying the California Motor analysis 
because it never raised this issue before the District Court and 
it did not raise the issue on appeal until its supplemental reply 
brief.  See Gardiner v. V.I. Water & Power Auth., 145 F.3d 
635, 646-47 (3d Cir. 1998).  Defendants argue that, before the 
District Court, Hanover Realty agreed it had to satisfy the test 
from Professional Real Estate.  We disagree that Hanover 
Realty has waived this argument.  Throughout this litigation 
Defendants have consistently argued for Noerr-Pennington 
immunity and Hanover Realty has consistently responded that 
the sham exception applies.  Hanover Realty’s failure to cite 
particular cases within its broader argument for the sham 
exception does not amount to a waiver.  Moreover, by 
alleging an “illegal scheme” through a “series of sham 
litigations,” Hanover Realty put Defendants on notice of the 
relevant facts supporting its theory under California Motor.  
App. 63.  Finally, Defendants have not been prejudiced by 
this argument because we exercise plenary review over this 
issue and they have filed a supplemental brief responding to 
Hanover Realty’s position. 
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California Motor and Professional Real Estate by concluding 
that they apply to different situations:  California Motor to a 
series of sham petitions and Professional Real Estate to a 
single sham petition.14  See Waugh Chapel S., LLC v. United 
Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 27, 728 F.3d 354, 
363-364 (4th Cir. 2013); Primetime 24 Joint Venture v. Nat’l 
Broad. Co., 219 F.3d 92, 101 (2d Cir. 2000); USS-POSCO 
Indus. v. Contra Costa Cnty. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 
AFL-CIO, 31 F.3d 800, 810-11 (9th Cir. 1994).   
 
 In the first case to tackle this issue, the Ninth Circuit 
explained that, in its view, the two-step inquiry in 
Professional Real Estate applies to the evaluation of a single 
suit or legal proceeding.  USS-POSCO, 31 F.3d at 810-11.  In 
such a case, the analysis is retrospective:  if the alleged sham 
petition is not objectively baseless, defendants are immune—
end of story.  See id. at 811.  California Motor, by contrast, is 
concerned with a defendant who brings a series of legal 
proceedings.  The Supreme Court there “recognized that the 
filing of a whole series of lawsuits and other legal actions 
without regard to the merits has far more serious implications 
than filing a single action.”  Id.  Thus, when faced with a 
series or pattern of lawsuits, “the question is not whether any 
one of them has merit—some may turn out to, just as a matter 
                                              
14 A staff report from the Federal Trade Commission also 
agrees with this view.  See Federal Trade Commission, 
Enforcement Perspectives on the Noerr-Pennington 
Doctrine, at 28-38 (2006) (“FTC Report”), available at https:/
/www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_docum
ents/ftc-staff-report-concerning-enforcement-perspectives-
noerr-pennington-doctrine/p013518enfperspectnoerr-
penningtondoctrine.pdf. 
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of chance—but whether they are brought pursuant to a policy 
of starting legal proceedings without regard to the merits and 
for the purpose of injuring a market rival.”  Id.  Unlike the 
inquiry from Professional Real Estate, this inquiry is 
prospective and asks whether the legal filings were made, 
“not out of a genuine interest in redressing grievances, but as 
part of a pattern or practice of successive filings undertaken 
essentially for purposes of harassment.”  Id.  
 
 We agree with the approach to California Motor and 
Professional Real Estate that has been adopted by the 
Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits.  As stated in Noerr itself, 
the ultimate purpose of this inquiry is to determine whether 
the petitioning activity is a “mere sham to cover what is 
actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly 
with the business relationships of a competitor.”  Noerr, 365 
U.S. at 144.  The best way to make that determination 
depends on whether there is a single filing or a series of 
filings.  Where there is only one alleged sham petition, 
Professional Real Estate’s exacting two-step test properly 
places a heavy thumb on the scale in favor of the defendant.  
With only one “data point,” it is difficult to determine with 
any precision whether the petition was anticompetitive.  See 
FTC Report at 35.  Thus, Professional Real Estate requires a 
showing of objective baselessness before looking into 
subjective motivations in order to prevent any undue chilling 
of First Amendment activity.  In contrast, a more flexible 
standard is appropriate when dealing with a pattern of 
petitioning.  Not only do pattern cases often involve more 
complex fact sets and a greater risk of antitrust harm, but the 
reviewing court sits in a much better position to assess 
whether a defendant has misused the governmental process to 
curtail competition.  As a result, even if a small number of the 
petitions turn out to have some objective merit, that should 
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not automatically immunize defendants from liability.  See 
USS-POSCO, 31 F.3d at 811 (“[E]ven a broken clock is right 
twice a day.”). 
 
 Accordingly, when a party alleges a series of legal 
proceedings, we conclude that the sham litigation standard 
from California Motor should govern.  This inquiry asks 
whether a series of petitions were filed with or without regard 
to merit and for the purpose of using the governmental 
process (as opposed to the outcome of that process) to harm a 
market rival and restrain trade.  In deciding whether there was 
such a policy of filing petitions with or without regard to 
merit, a court should perform a holistic review that may 
include looking at the defendant’s filing success—i.e., win-
loss percentage—as circumstantial evidence of the 
defendant’s subjective motivations.  Compare Waugh, 728 
F.3d at 365 (finding sham where one of fourteen proceedings 
was successful), with USS-POSCO, 31 F.3d at 811 (finding 
no sham where fifteen of twenty-nine lawsuits were 
successful), and Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc. v. Abbott 
Labs., Inc., 552 F.3d 1033, 1046 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding no 
sham where defendant “won seven of the seventeen suits” and 
each of the ten remaining cases “had a plausible argument on 
which it could have prevailed”).  If more than an insignificant 
number of filings have objective merit, a defendant likely did 
not have a policy of filing “willy-nilly without regard to 
success.”  See USS-POSCO, 31 F.3d at 811.  A high 
percentage of meritless or objectively baseless proceedings, 
on the other hand, will tend to support a finding that the 
filings were not brought to redress any actual grievances.  See 
City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., 499 U.S. 365, 380 
(1991) (explaining that “the filing of frivolous objections . . . 
simply in order to impose expense and delay” is the “classic 
example” of a sham).  Courts should also consider other 
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evidence of bad-faith as well as the magnitude and nature of 
the collateral harm imposed on plaintiffs by defendants’ 
petitioning activity (e.g., abuses of the discovery process and 
interference with access to governmental agencies).  See 
Professional Real Estate, 508 U.S. at 68 (Stevens, J., 
concurring).   
 
 Defendants argue as a threshold matter that the four 
actions they filed against Hanover Realty are too few to even 
qualify as a pattern or series.  We are not convinced.  In so 
concluding, we do not set a minimum number requirement for 
the applicability of California Motor or find that four sham 
petitions will always support the use of California Motor.  It 
is sufficient for our purposes that four petitions were filed 
against Hanover Realty and it alleges that Defendants filed 
these sham proceedings at every opportunity to obstruct 
Hanover Realty from “obtaining all necessary government 
approvals.”  App. 71.  
 
 Turning to Hanover Realty’s allegations, we conclude 
it can establish that Defendants had a policy of filing 
anticompetitive sham petitions.  Defendants’ challenge to the 
Flood Permit was objectively baseless.  The Environmental 
Department issued Hanover Realty its permit and found that 
ShopRite had only a generalized property interest and its 
claim of greater competition did not demonstrate it was an 
aggrieved party.  Courts have “consistently” rejected the 
types of arguments offered by Defendants, the Environmental 
Department explained.  App. 157.  In addition to the lack of 
objective merit, Hanover Realty alleges indicia of bad faith.  
For example, it alleges that, five months after they submitted 
a request for an adjudicatory hearing, Defendants filed an 
amended request with “new” proposed facts that were already 
known to Defendants at the time they submitted their initial 
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request.  The “only basis” for this filing, Hanover Realty 
alleges, was to slow down the review process.  App. 76.  
Defendants’ alleged tactic suggests they were more interested 
in delay than in redressing any grievances.  
 
 Similarly, with respect to the action in lieu of 
prerogative writs, the New Jersey state court easily found that 
ShopRite was not an interested party because it failed to show 
how any of its rights would be affected by the approval of 
Hanover Realty’s site plan.  The court dismissed the 
complaint.  We agree that Defendants’ arguments for why 
they had standing are objectively baseless.  Hanover Realty 
also alleges that Defendants filed three amended complaints 
only for the purpose of delay.  This allegation indicates that 
Defendants’ complaint was not brought out of a genuine 
desire to obtain relief, but rather to keep the suit pending as 
long as possible. 
 
 Defendants claim two victorious moments with respect 
to the Wetlands Permit.  They first point to the fact that they 
successfully identified a technical deficiency in the 
application, and that the Environmental Department required 
Hanover Realty to correct this administrative error.  We liken 
this to hitting a single in the second inning.  Hanover Realty 
submitted a new application within days and the problem was 
resolved.  See Waugh, 728 F.3d at 365 (“[T]he fact that there 
may be moments of merit within a series of lawsuits is not 
inconsistent with a campaign of sham litigation.”).  
Defendants also remind us that the Environmental 
Department required Hanover Realty to conduct a survey for 
the presence of Indiana bats, as it had requested.  But this also 
does not qualify as success.  The ostensible goal of 
Defendants’ challenge was for the Environmental Department 
to deny the Wetlands Permit.  They were unsuccessful on that 
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front; Hanover Realty received the permit.  Hanover Realty 
also alleges subjective evidence of abusing the governmental 
process.  Defendants allegedly complained to the United 
States Fish and Wildlife Service even though they knew the 
wetlands at issue are not federally regulated waters.  
Moreover, in an email, Defendants’ ecological consultant 
touted its ability to delay the permit approval process.  
 
 Defendants arguably fared slightly better in connection 
with their challenge to the Street Permit.  They submitted 
objections to the Department of Transportation arguing, 
among other things, that Hanover Realty was required to 
build an overpass over a highway before beginning 
construction.  In its letter responding to the parties, the 
Department of Transportation did acknowledge that it was 
required to consider any data or arguments submitted by third 
parties.  Defendants extract success from that statement, but 
we do not.  That the Department of Transportation was 
required to consider Defendants’ challenge does not mean 
that their arguments had any bite.  Where Defendants did 
have some success, however, was in the Department of 
Transportation’s finding that the prior developer’s agreement 
triggered the need for additional highway improvements.  
But, rather than requiring Hanover Realty to make those 
improvements, the letter recognized that such construction 
might not be feasible or worthwhile.  It therefore 
recommended that Hanover Realty negotiate a modification 
to the agreement with the Department of Transportation 
before proceeding any further.  This action was a partial 
success because Defendants’ challenge did have some merit, 
but it did not cause the Department of Transportation to 
actually reject the permit application.  
 
 All in all, the allegations and the record show that 
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Hanover Realty received the Flood and Wetlands Permits, it 
got the state-court action dismissed, and it avoided having to 
make significant highway improvements.  Defendants’ 
meager record on the merits supports Hanover Realty’s 
allegation that that the filings were not brought to redress any 
grievances.  Nor have Defendants articulated any genuine 
interest in flooding or traffic near the proposed Wegmans 
(which is two miles away from the ShopRite), or in protecting 
the Indiana bat.  Rather, Hanover Realty sufficiently alleges 
that Defendants brought these actions under a policy of 
harassment with the effect of obstructing Hanover Realty’s 
access to governmental bodies.  The filings have imposed 
significant expense on Hanover Realty, have continued to 
delay the project, and threaten the viability of the project 
altogether.  That Defendants have had some insignificant 
success along the way does not alter the analysis when 
reviewing a pattern or series of proceedings.  Accordingly, 
Hanover Realty can establish that the sham exception to 
Noerr-Pennington immunity applies because it sufficiently 
alleges that Defendants “instituted the proceedings and 
actions . . . with or without probable cause, and regardless of 
the merits of the cases.”  Cal. Motor, 404 U.S. at 516.15 
 
 C. Remaining Arguments 
 
                                              
15 Defendants also argue that, because some of the 
proceedings are ongoing, Hanover Realty’s suit is premature.  
We reject this argument because the California Motor 
analysis is prospective, not retrospective.  See USS-POSCO, 
31 F.3d at 810-11.  If we were to agree with Defendants on 
this point, they could keep filing petitions and avoid judicial 
review indefinitely.  
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 Defendants contend that Hanover Realty has failed to 
allege facts showing that there is a “dangerous probability of 
[Defendants] achieving monopoly power.”  W. Penn 
Allegheny, 627 F.3d at 108.  In support of this position, 
Defendants argue that Hanover Realty has not adequately 
alleged a product or geographic market.16   
 
 According to Defendants, Hanover Realty has not 
properly defined the alleged product market for full-service 
supermarkets because it has not distinguished full-service 
supermarkets from any other supermarkets or grocery stores.  
Defendants believe this supposed submarket is a contrivance.  
We disagree.  “Competing products are in the same market if 
they are readily substitutable for one another; a market’s outer 
boundaries are determined by the reasonable 
interchangeability of use between a product and its substitute, 
or by the cross-elasticity of demand.”  Broadcom, 501 F.3d at 
307 (citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 
325 (1962)).  Moreover, “in most cases, proper market 
definition can be determined only after a factual inquiry into 
the commercial realities faced by consumers.”  Queen City 
Pizza, Inc. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 436 (3d 
Cir. 1997).  We cannot say, at this very early stage in the 
litigation, that Hanover Realty’s product market is 
implausible.  Hanover Realty alleges that full-service 
supermarkets are distinct from other grocery suppliers 
because they provide customers with additional amenities, 
                                              
16 Because we already found that Hanover Realty does not 
have antitrust standing for its claim of attempted 
monopolization of the full-service supermarket shopping 
center market (Count Two), we address here only the claim 
relating to full-service supermarkets (Count One). 
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including prepared foods to go, on-site dining options, wine 
and liquor, specialty products, and other services such as 
pharmacies, banks, and fitness centers.  Hanover Realty 
further alleges that consumers have come to enjoy full-service 
supermarkets as a one-stop shopping experience that allows 
them to avoid driving to different stores to check off the items 
on their grocery lists.  Because consumers plausibly treat full-
service supermarkets as a distinct submarket, the allegations 
here support the position that the market for full-service 
supermarkets “encompass[es] all interchangeable substitute 
products.”  Id.  Through discovery, Hanover Realty may be 
able to demonstrate that a price increase at the ShopRite 
would not cause consumers to shop at other more traditional 
grocery stores. 
 
 Defendants also argue that the proposed geographic 
market—greater Morristown—is too imprecise.  In 
Defendants’ view, Hanover Realty has not alleged facts 
suggesting that ShopRite could raise prices without causing 
consumers to drive elsewhere.  Again, we disagree.  “[T]he 
relevant geographic market is the area in which a potential 
buyer may rationally look for the goods or services he or she 
seeks.”  Eichorn v. AT&T Corp., 248 F.3d 131, 147 (3d Cir. 
2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Hanover Realty 
alleges that, when it comes to buying groceries, consumers 
like to shop near their homes.  Thus, it alleges, proximity to a 
large upscale population is an important factor in determining 
where to locate a full-service supermarket.  We find it 
plausible that greater Morristown, which includes Morristown 
and its neighboring communities, is a distinct geographic 
market.  If the ShopRite in Morristown raised its prices, it is 
plausible that only the most diligent and frugal customer 
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would move his or her grocery shopping to a more distant 
supermarket.17 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm in part, 
vacate in part, and remand to the District Court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
                                              
17 We have considered and rejected Defendants’ remaining 
arguments.  They argue there is no dangerous probability of 
achieving a monopoly because there is another full-service 
supermarket in the area—the Stop & Shop of Morris Plains.  
Defendants maintain that Hanover Realty has admitted this 
fact.  But in making that argument, Defendants rely on 
Hanover Realty’s initial complaint, not its amended 
complaint, which is operative.  In the amended complaint, 
Hanover Realty alleges that the Stop & Shop is a “grocery 
store,” App. 72, and that ShopRite is the “only full-service 
supermarket” in Greater Morristown, App. 73.  We must 
accept those allegations as true.  Defendants’ final argument 
is that Hanover Realty has failed to allege a specific intent to 
monopolize.  For the reasons discussed above in connection 
with the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, we conclude Hanover 
Realty sufficiently alleges that Defendants filed a series of 
sham proceedings with the intent to interfere with a 
prospective competitor and restrain trade. 
Hanover 3201 Realty LLC v. Village Supermarkets 
No. 14-4183 
                                                                                                                                                
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part and concurring in 
part. 
I respectfully disagree with my colleagues’ view that 
Hanover 3201 Realty has suffered antitrust injury, a necessary 
component of antitrust standing.  In my view, because the 
anticompetitive effects of Village Supermarkets’ actions (as 
opposed to the damages sustained directly from any tort) do 
not hurt Hanover, a landlord and not a player in the market 
for full-service supermarkets, it lacks antitrust standing to 
bring this suit. 
However, I recognize that my colleagues’ view of 
antitrust standing is, by virtue of their ruling, the holding of 
our Court and now the law of this Circuit.  In this context, I 
believe I am obliged to consider the merits of Hanover’s suit.  
Among other things, I agree with Judge Fuentes that Village’s 
Noerr–Pennington immunity defense is a sham and hence 
unavailing at this stage.  Thus I vote to vacate the judgment of 
the District Court and remand.   
This sets the stage for a most interesting interplay of 
whether to vote by issue (in which case Hanover wins, as, 
while I lose on the issue of standing, I align with Judge 
Fuentes on the lack of merit for Village’s claim of immunity 
under Noerr-Pennington) or outcome (whereby Village wins, 
as my outcome, though for different reasons, aligns with 
Judge Greenberg’s).  I opt for the former for the reasons 
noted below. 
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I. Hanover Lacks Antitrust Standing 
 A. Law of Antitrust Injury 
In order to state a claim for violation of the antitrust 
laws, a plaintiff must show that it has suffered “antitrust 
injury, which is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws 
were intended to prevent and that flows from that which 
makes [the] defendants’ acts unlawful.”  Brunswick Corp. v. 
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).  
Antitrust injury is a necessary but not sufficient component of 
antitrust standing, a prudential limitation on the Clayton Act’s 
broad language concerning the right to sue.  Barton & 
Pittinos, Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 118 F.3d 178, 
182 (3d Cir. 1997). 
We have held that a plaintiff ordinarily does not suffer 
“antitrust injury” if it is “not a competitor or a consumer in 
the market allegedly restrained,” id. at 181, unless “there 
exists a ‘significant causal connection’ such that the harm to 
the plaintiff . . . [is] ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the 
antitrust conspiracy,” Gulfstream III Associates, Inc. v. 
Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 995 F.2d 425, 429 (3d Cir. 
1993) (quoting Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 484 
(1982)).  This exception is narrow, and antitrust injury is 
“almost exclusively suffered by consumers or competitors.”  
Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip 
Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d 912, 926 (3d Cir. 1999).1 
                                                 
1 Our law that a plaintiff ought to be a consumer or 
competitor and that the “inextricably intertwined” injury 
presents a limited “exception” to this “requirement” is not the 
only way to read the relevant Supreme Court cases.  The 
leading case on antitrust standing treated consumer-or-
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 My principal disagreement with my colleagues 
concerns how to read the “inextricably intertwined” 
exception.  As I understand their opinion, they hew closely to 
the meaning of those two particular words and believe that a 
plaintiff has suffered an antitrust injury if its injury is closely 
related to a defendant’s actions that also amount to an 
antitrust violation.  By contrast, I believe the rule remains that 
“antitrust injury should reflect the anticompetitive effect 
either of the violation or of anticompetitive acts made 
possible by the violation.”  Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489.  In 
my view, even if a plaintiff has suffered direct harm from a 
defendant’s acts, and even if those acts violate the antitrust 
laws, it has not suffered antitrust injury unless its own harm 
stems from the anticompetitive consequences of the 
defendant’s conduct. 
As the majority notes, the “inextricably intertwined” 
language comes from the Supreme Court’s decision in 
McCready, a case with exceptionally broad dicta about 
antitrust standing.  In that case, the plaintiff, who was insured 
by Blue Shield, saw a psychologist.  McCready, 457 U.S. at 
468.  Blue Shield allegedly colluded with psychiatrists to 
divert patients like McCready from psychologists by 
declining to reimburse the latter’s services.  Id. at 469–70.  It 
argued that McCready had not suffered antitrust injury 
because neither psychiatrists’ nor psychologists’ prices 
                                                                                                             
competitor status as one of several factors a court should 
weigh in considering whether a plaintiff has antitrust 
standing, Associated Gen. Contractors v. Cal. State Council 
of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 539 (1983), and in other circuits 
consumer-or-competitor status is less strongly emphasized.  
See, e.g., Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 505 F.3d 302, 311 
(4th Cir. 2007).  However, it is the settled law of our Court. 
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increased as a result of its scheme (ignoring the de facto price 
increase of the insurance company’s failure to reimburse the 
insured), id. at 481–84, and that the point of the alleged 
scheme was to harm psychologists, not their insured patients, 
id. at 478–79.2  But the Supreme Court held that “[a]lthough 
McCready was not a competitor of the conspirators 
[psychiatrists and Blue Shield], the injury she suffered was 
inextricably intertwined with the injury the conspirators 
sought to inflict on psychologists and the psychotherapy 
market.”  457 U.S. at 483–84.   
The reason McCready’s injury was inextricably 
intertwined with the harm inflicted on the psychotherapy 
market was that she was a consumer in that market and her 
“injuries [were] the essential means by which defendants’ 
illegal conduct brought about its ultimate injury to the 
marketplace.”  Ethypharm S.A. France v. Abbott Labs., 707 
F.3d 223, 237 n.21 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting IIA Philip E. 
Areeda, et al., Antitrust Law ¶ 339, at 123 (3d ed. 2007)).  
However, the term “essential means” does not mean that 
anyone who suffers any injury in the context of an 
anticompetitive scheme may sue under the antitrust laws.  In 
McCready, although the plaintiff was not the ultimate target 
of the cartel’s activity, Blue Shield and the psychiatrists used 
a classic antitrust harm—increased prices—as a fulcrum to 
distort the psychotherapy market, specifically to the detriment 
of psychologists.  The McCready Court affirmed that a person 
who suffers antitrust injury— i.e., who is injured because of 
                                                 
2 Blue Shield’s argument was based in part on a now-
outmoded theory that only the “target” of an antitrust 
violation could bring suit.  Id. at 478 n.14 & 479 n.15; see 
also Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 536 n.33 
(rejecting “target area” theory). 
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the anticompetitive effects of a cartel or monopolist’s 
activity—may bring suit even if that person is not a consumer 
from whom the defendant seeks to extract supracompetitive 
rents or a competitor the defendant seeks to eliminate.  See 
IIA Areeda, supra, ¶ 339, at 144 (4th ed. 2014) (“[T]he result 
of the alleged antitrust conspiracy would be higher prices in 
the very market in which McCready was a purchaser. . . .  
McCready is thus like a purchaser from a cartel at cartel 
prices.”). 
 B. Hanover Has Not Suffered Antitrust  
   Injury 
Here, Hanover alleges monopolization of two markets, 
one for “full service supermarkets,” and one for “full service 
supermarket shopping centers,” the latter defined as the 
market for real property that can be used for full-service 
supermarkets.  It does not participate in the supermarket 
business; it is a landlord and developer.  It operates a 
development enterprise in the real-estate market, but it does 
not sell goods or provide consumer services the way Village 
does.  And although Hanover does participate in the market 
for real property that can be used for full-service 
supermarkets, Village’s actions have not affected that market.  
In other words, Hanover does not participate in the market 
that was allegedly restrained, and the market it does 
participate in was not restrained.  Hanover has thus not 
suffered an antitrust injury. 
  1. Full-service Supermarket Market 
Unlike the relationship in McCready between the 
plaintiff and the market for psychotherapy services, whether 
the market for full-service supermarkets is ultimately 
restrained does not matter to Hanover.  Its injuries flow from 
Village’s alleged wrongful use of civil proceedings and from 
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Hanover’s contract with Wegmans that allocated to Hanover 
some portion of the risk of failing to develop the parcel within 
a certain period of time.  Village’s alleged attempted 
monopolization of the relevant markets hurts Wegmans, a 
full-service supermarket, and it hurts consumers who would 
prefer a choice among supermarkets, but as Village is not 
alleged to have restrained the market for real estate in 
Morristown or anywhere else, it is hard to see why Hanover is 
a proper antitrust plaintiff even if it has valid tort claims 
arising out of otherwise anticompetitive conduct.  In short, 
because the anticompetitive effects of Village’s allegedly 
illegal activity have not caused any injury to Hanover, it does 
not have an antitrust claim. 
Several sources of authority support the notion that a 
landlord is an improper antitrust plaintiff when it complains 
of injury flowing from antitrust harm directed at a tenant.  
The leading treatise deals with the situation in one terse 
paragraph:  “The landlord receiving a set rather than variable 
rent is simply a supplier of an input . . . .  Such landlords are 
almost always denied standing for antitrust violations that 
target their tenants or that occur in the product market.”  IIA 
Areeda, supra, ¶ 351c, at 286.  We have also disposed of 
claims brought by landlords without much analysis beyond 
indicating that any injury the landlord suffered, even when its 
rent was tied to the tenant’s revenue, was too remote from the 
antitrust violation to allow the landlord to bring suit.   
[A] non-operating lessor-owner of a motion 
picture theatre who is entitled to rental based on 
a percentage of receipts is nonetheless not a 
“person . . . injured in his business or property” 
within the meaning of section 4 of the Clayton 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, and, therefore, is not 
entitled to bring suit under the Act for an 
alleged conspiracy relating to the licensing of 
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pictures at the theatre by the lessee-operator.  
Melrose Realty Co. v. Loew’s, Inc., 234 F.2d 518, 519 (3d 
Cir. 1956) (per curiam); see also Harrison v. Paramount 
Pictures, Inc., 211 F.2d 405, 405 (3d Cir. 1954) (affirming for 
the reasons stated in the District Court’s opinion, see 115 F. 
Supp. 312 (E.D. Pa. 1953), which held that a movie theater 
lessor was too remote from antitrust harm directed at movie 
distributors).  More recently, we held that “[a] supplier does 
not suffer an antitrust injury when competition is reduced in 
the downstream market in which it sells goods or services.”  
W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 
102 (3d Cir. 2010).  And a landlord is in the same shoes as a 
supplier from an antitrust-injury perspective.  IIA Areeda, 
supra, ¶ 351c at 286. 
Other courts of appeals that have faced facts similar to 
our case have rejected the landlord’s standing.  Most closely 
on point is Serfecz v. Jewel Food Stores, 67 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 
1995), where owners and operators of a shopping mall sought 
to recover damages from an anchor tenant, a grocery store.  
The tenant opened another store nearby, vacated its old 
premises, and would not sublease them to another grocery 
store.  The Seventh Circuit Court held that the “plaintiffs 
d[id] not have the requisite direct injury to have standing to 
assert that [the defendant] ha[d] monopolized, or conspired 
with others to monopolize, the retail grocery market,” id. at 
598–99, because plaintiffs were players in the shopping 
center market, not the retail grocery business.   
Similarly, in a Sixth Circuit case a grocery store 
subleased to a competitor grocery store and then engaged in 
anticompetitive conduct to ruin it.  Southaven Land Co. v. 
Malone & Hyde, Inc., 715 F.2d 1079, 1081 (6th Cir. 1983).  
The plaintiff, a landlord that owned the rest of the shopping 
center of which the grocery store was a part, found a 
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replacement grocery store, but the defendant would not 
sublease to it, presumably lowering the value of the shopping 
center.  The Court noted that “Southaven’s [the land owner’s] 
injury [was] charged to have accrued as a result of its contract 
negotiations with the alleged antitrust violator.  The 
complaint noticeably fail[ed] to aver that Southaven sustained 
any injury as a competitor, purchaser, consumer or other 
economic actor in the grocery industry.”  Id. at 1081.  
Ultimately, the Court held that as “Southaven is not a 
consumer, customer, competitor or participant in the relevant 
market or otherwise inextricably intertwined with any such 
entity[, i]ts injury [was] not sufficiently linked to the pro-
competitive policy of the antitrust laws” to confer standing on 
it.  Id. at 1087; accord Rosenberg v. Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & 
Hamilton, 598 F. Supp. 642, 645–46 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (“No 
matter how causal a relationship may exist between the 
alleged violation and injury, the defendants’ actions were not 
undertaken to interfere with the economic freedom of 
participants in the construction business.”). 
Because I read the Supreme Court’s and our cases on 
antitrust standing to require a plaintiff’s harm to be at least 
“inextricably intertwined” with whatever makes a defendant’s 
conduct specifically an antitrust violation—e.g., higher prices 
or reduced output—I believe Hanover lacks standing with 
respect to the allegedly unlawful restraint of the full-service 
supermarket market.  Hence I respectfully dissent from the 
decision of my colleagues to reverse on this issue. 
  2. Full-Service Supermarket   
    Shopping Center Market 
Hanover also alleges that it competes directly with 
H&H, the special purpose entity that owns the land for 
Village’s supermarket, in the “full service supermarket 
shopping center market” of greater Morristown.  This title for 
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the market, besides being a mouthful, is confusing, as the 
market players are said to be landowners “whose property is 
or can be utilized by or rented to a full-service supermarket.”  
Am. Compl. ¶ 32, J.A. 69.  Thus the market is for certain real 
property.  The Serfecz plaintiffs, who lacked standing insofar 
as they alleged monopolization of the retail grocery market, 
nevertheless had standing with respect to the shopping center 
market.  67 F.3d at 599.  This was because they had 
ownership interests in a mall, and the defendant (a former 
anchor tenant and grocery store) allegedly colluded with a 
different shopping center to drive Serfecz’s mall out of 
business.  Id. at 595, 599.  Hanover argues that H&H and 
Village are trying to keep Hanover out of the full-service 
supermarket shopping center market in the same way that the 
Serfecz defendants allegedly drove the plaintiffs out of the 
mall business. 
Unlike the plaintiffs in Serfecz, neither Hanover nor 
H&H is specifically in the business of operating shopping 
centers.  Instead, they are owners and developers of real 
property.  Hanover does not allege, for example, that its 
parcel’s value decreased following Village and H&H’s 
attempts to exclude competitors from the market for owning 
land on which supermarkets can be leased.  And the 
Complaint does not allege that Village’s efforts have affected 
the market for real property in Morristown or anywhere else 
to any significant degree.  As Hanover has not plausibly 
alleged that Village’s monopolistic conduct has injured it as a 
landowner, it cannot be said that the frustration of its contract 
with Wegmans “reflect[s] the anticompetitive effect . . . of the 
violation.”  Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489; cf. IIA Areeda, 
supra, ¶ 351b1, at 284 (“In the movies cases, for example, the 
defendant’s conduct . . . depriv[ed] rival film producers, 
distributors, or exhibitors of adequate access to markets or 
supplies.  The landlord is a stranger to those interests: the real 
estate market as a whole is not significantly affected.”).   
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Thus, and for the reasons ably expressed in Part II.A.2 
of Judge Fuentes’ opinion, I agree that Hanover lacks 
antitrust standing with respect to what it calls the full-service 
supermarket shopping center market. 
II. Noerr–Pennington and Remaining Issues 
I agree with Judge Fuentes’ views on Noerr–
Pennington and Village’s other objections to Hanover’s 
Complaint.  Hence I join Part II.B–C of his opinion. 
III. How to Decide This Case? 
This case presents what academic literature terms a 
“voting paradox.”  On the one hand, two judges (Judge 
Greenberg and I) believe that the outcome should be that 
Hanover’s suit not proceed, though we do so for different 
reasons.  However, one majority of this Court (Judges 
Fuentes and Greenberg) believes that Hanover has antitrust 
standing (I do not because I do not discern antitrust injury), 
while another majority (Judge Fuentes and I) believes that 
Hanover should survive Village’s motion to dismiss 
(assuming it has antitrust standing).  The paradox is that, if I 
vote on the judgment of this case (affirm or reverse) based on 
my individual views, a majority of the Court will have ruled 
against the prevailing party on each relevant issue, meaning 
that our Court’s reasoning would not support its judgment.  
However, if I follow, despite my dissent, Judge Fuentes and 
Greenberg on the antitrust standing issue, my individual vote 
would be inconsistent with my view of who should win were 
I alone ruling. 
But to me it is significant that we are not acting alone.  
Because we need to act as a Court, I think it is more 
appropriate for me to be bound by the majority’s opinion on 
antitrust standing despite my disagreement with it.  Before I 
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explain my choice in detail, I shall survey the current state of 
thinking on this issue.  
A. Law and Scholarship on the Voting Paradox 
Although I do not write on an entirely blank slate with 
respect to this issue, there is surprisingly little discussion in 
judicial opinions about how one ought to vote when facing 
such a paradox.  Where a majority agrees on the bottom-line 
outcome in a case, shifting majorities with varied lines of 
reasoning are more common; these variable groups 
unquestionably describe the holdings of the relevant courts.  
See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) 
(resolving whether there was a constitutional violation by one 
majority per Justice Stevens over Justice Breyer’s dissent but 
ordering remedy via a different majority per Justice Breyer 
over Justice Stevens’ dissent); Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. 
Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 302 (3d Cir. 2014) (“Although a majority 
of the Court thus does not accept the District Court’s ruling 
that CBP did not have standing, this conclusion does not 
change our outcome in light of a different majority’s 
independent conclusion that the Court properly entered 
summary judgment against the plaintiffs.”); United States v. 
Aguila-Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d 915, 916 (9th Cir. 2011); O 
Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 
389 F.3d 973 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc); United States v. 
Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 897 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc); Davis 
v. U.S. Steel Corp., 779 F.2d 209, 210 (4th Cir. 1985). 
It is thus commonplace that majorities composed of 
different allotments of judges lay down the law, and it would 
seem to follow that a judge may vote on a judgment based on 
the relevant court’s legal conclusions even if the judge 
disagrees with the court’s resolution of a dispositive issue.  
However, it is quite rare that judges are actually faced with a 
voting paradox where it is debatable whether the proper result 
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is to vote according to the judge’s personal preference or to 
vote according to shifting majorities’ statements of the law.  
In three Supreme Court cases, justices have noted that their 
votes on the judgment were inconsistent with their individual 
views of the proper outcome of the case.  Arizona v. 
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 313 (1991) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in the judgment); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 
491 U.S. 1, 45 (1989) (White, J., concurring in the judgment 
in part and dissenting in part); United States v. Vuitch, 402 
U.S. 62, 96 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting as to jurisdiction); 
id. at 97 (opinion of Blackmun, J.). 
Fulminante and Vuitch are especially relevant.  In the 
former case, the Arizona Supreme Court held that a 
confession was coerced and thus inadmissible.  State v. 
Fulminante, 778 P.2d 602, 627 (Ariz. 1988), aff’d, 499 U.S. 
279 (1991).  In deciding whether to affirm or reverse, the U.S. 
Supreme Court faced three issues: (1) whether the 
defendant’s confession was coerced; (2) if so, whether 
harmless error analysis applied; and (3) if so, whether the 
admission of the confession was harmless error.  Fulminante, 
499 U.S. at 279, 282, 295.  Five justices concluded the 
confession was coerced, id. at 287; a different group of five 
justices concluded harmless error applies to coerced 
confessions, id. at 311–12; and still a third group of five held 
that the admission there was not harmless, id. at 302.  At the 
same time, five justices thought the Arizona Supreme Court 
should have been reversed, though for no consistent reason.  
See id. at 306 (opinion of Rehnquist, C.J., that confession was 
not coerced, joined by O’Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.); id. 
at 312 (opinion of Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Scalia, J., that 
admission of confession was harmless).  Justice Kennedy 
yielded to the majority on the question of whether the 
confession was coerced and thus reached the harmless-error 
issue; he concluded the admission was not harmless and thus 
supported the judgment affirming the Arizona Supreme 
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Court.  Id. at 313–14.  Likewise, in Vuitch Justices Harlan and 
Blackmun acceded to a majority’s disposition as to 
jurisdiction, but—together with other justices—formed a 
separate majority on the merits. 402 U.S. at 96, 97.3 
Similarly, in the panel opinion of United States v. 
Andis, 277 F.3d 984, 985 (8th Cir. 2002), rev’d, 333 F.3d 886 
(8th Cir. 2003) (en banc), two judges held that the right to 
                                                 
3 Union Gas is less squarely on point because no majority 
supported that judgment on every point.  The issues were (1) 
whether two Congressional statutes were intended to abrogate 
state sovereign immunity and (2) whether Congress had that 
power under the Commerce Clause.  491 U.S. at 5.  Five 
justices held the statutes purported to annul state sovereign 
immunity and five that Congress had the power to do so.  Id. 
at 13.  However, only four justices agreed on a rationale for 
Congress’s constitutional power.  Justice White’s cryptic 
concurrence stated on the constitutional question only that “I 
agree with the conclusion reached by Justice Brennan in Part 
III of his opinion, that Congress has the authority under 
Article I to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of 
the States, although I do not agree with much of his 
reasoning.” Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. at 57 (White, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).  It 
was this absence of reasoning—not, as Judge Greenberg’s 
dissent suggests, Justice White’s yielding to his colleagues on 
the statutory interpretation question—that caused the 
“confusion” noted in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 
517 U.S. 44, 64 (1996) (“Justice White, who provided the 
fifth vote for the result, wrote separately in order to indicate 
his disagreement with the plurality’s rationale.”). 
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appeal an illegal sentence could not be waived, but a different 
majority held that the sentence should be vacated.  Two 
judges, acting independently, would have affirmed the 
sentence—one because he viewed the waiver as valid and 
another because he thought the sentence was legal.  Id.  
However, the judge who viewed the waiver as valid voted to 
remand the case for further proceedings because on the 
merits, assuming the issue was not waived, he believed the 
sentence was illegal.  Id. at 989 (Morris Sheppard Arnold, J., 
dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment).  This vote 
was made without much comment except that “otherwise the 
court could not issue a mandate.”  Id.  (In fact, a mandate 
could have just as easily issued if the two judges preferring 
affirmance voted to affirm.) 4 
At the same time, there have been cases where judges 
or justices stick to their individual guns with the result that, 
although a majority supports a given judgment, a careful 
reading of all the opinions in the case reveals that no majority 
supports the prevailing party on any issue logically necessary 
                                                 
4 There may also be some support for issue voting in our 
decision in United States v. Bazzano, 712 F.2d 826 (3d Cir. 
1983) (en banc) (per curiam).  In that case, nine of the ten 
judges would have voted to remand the case to the District 
Court.  But no majority could agree on what the District 
Court should do on remand.  Id. at 829 (noting that the 
“differing grounds on which these various votes for remand 
are rested cannot be reconciled so as to yield a majority vote 
for a remand with consistent instructions to the district 
court”).  We thus affirmed the District Court’s judgment, 
despite nine of the ten judges agreeing on the outcome, 
because no majority could agree on rationale.       
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to its victory.  For example, Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 
(1998), presented four questions, and shifting majorities of 
the Supreme Court sided with Miller on each one; nonetheless 
six justices, for differing reasons, thought Miller should lose, 
which she did.  Maxwell L. Stearns, Should Justices Ever 
Switch Votes? Miller v. Albright in Social Choice 
Perspective, 7 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 87, 102 (1999).  To muddy 
the waters further, scholars believe that in other cases justices 
or judges have cast votes in favor of analyses with which they 
did not agree in order to mask voting paradoxes.  See, e.g., 
Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell L. Stearns, Beyond 
Counting Votes: The Political Economy of Bush v. Gore, 54 
Vand. L. Rev. 1849, 1938–41 (2001). 
Given this array of paradoxical (or potentially so) 
cases and the striking absence of analysis of how to vote in 
any of them, it is not surprising that there is no set rule on 
how an appellate judge should vote.  Generally, scholars who 
analyze voting paradoxes (and there are several) discuss two 
possibilities: “issue voting” and “outcome voting.”  Broadly 
speaking, the former occurs when a judge surveys the holding 
on each question of law presented; a majority vote on any 
given issue counts as a holding of the court, and the 
remaining judge is bound by it as if it occurred in a prior 
precedential case.5  The latter, and more common, scenario 
                                                 
5 This equation of precedent with an issue is problematic in a 
court that has power to overrule its precedent, like the en banc 
Third Circuit or the Supreme Court.  Indeed, when a panel is 
in a position to overrule prior precedent, a voting paradox 
may be more likely.  See David S. Cohen, The Precedent-
Based Voting Paradox, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 183, 184 (2010).  
Luckily, that is not the case with a panel of this Court.  See 
Third Circuit I.O.P. 9.1 (“It is the tradition of this court that 
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occurs when a judge votes on the result of a case (affirm, 
vacate, reverse, etc.) according to his or her view of the 
proper outcome and without regard to the views of the other 
judges on a panel.  Even if a careful reading of the judges’ 
opinions in a case shows that a majority would rule for the 
losing party on each relevant issue, an outcome-vote, as that 
term is usually used in the relevant literature, results in a win 
for the party the majority of judges think should win 
regardless of reasoning. 
Before discussing the pros and cons of each voting 
protocol, I note that one thing is clear: as a formal matter, 
judges vote on the result of a case, i.e., whether to affirm, 
reverse, vacate, dismiss, remand, or some combination of 
these; otherwise, the clerk of a court could not enter judgment 
pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 36.  But even though “result” and 
“outcome” are synonyms, it does not follow that my vote on 
the disposition must be what I have just defined as an 
“outcome vote.”  I am aware of no source of law that tells me 
whether my vote must be based on how I view our Court’s 
holding on each relevant issue or on how I personally view 
the best outcome of the case. 
B. An Issue Vote is Preferable Here 
There are two closely related reasons why I choose to 
vote by issue in this case, and I will discuss them in turn: (1) 
the execution of our dual responsibilities to resolve disputes 
and declare the law; and (2) the role of a judge on a 
multimember court.   
                                                                                                             
the holding of a panel in a precedential opinion is binding on 
subsequent panels.  Thus, no subsequent panel overrules the 
holding in a precedential opinion of a previous panel.  Court 
en banc consideration is required to do so.”). 
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 1. Our Dual Responsibilities:  Dispute  
   Resolution and Law Declaration 
Those who sit on, appear before, or study  federal 
courts are familiar with the notion that we serve two primary 
functions: dispute resolution and law declaration.  The former 
role is rooted in the limitation that courts only decide “cases” 
and “controversies.” U.S. Const., art. III, § 2.  To carry out 
this role, a court issues judgments in the cases before it; in the 
case of an appellate court, the judgment, as noted, will usually 
be to affirm, reverse, vacate, dismiss, remand, or some 
combination thereof.  
A court’s second role is “to say what the law is.”  
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).  
This role flows directly from the first.  “Those who apply the 
rule to particular cases . . . must of necessity expound and 
interpret that rule.”  Id.  To fulfill its law-declaration function, 
a court often writes opinions explaining the law and reasoning 
underlying its judgments.  See also Jonathan Remy Nash, A 
Context-Sensitive Voting Protocol Paradigm for 
Multimember Courts, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 75, 86–87 (2003) 
(“Courts function as arbiters of particular disputes between 
litigants.  Those litigants are concerned with the outcome of 
the case as determined by the courts.  But, in handing down 
decisions, courts serve another important role: They announce 
(or aid in the evolution and development of) generally 
applicable rules of law.”).  
To me, issue voting better accomplishes both roles by 
deciding all necessary (including threshold) issues and 
proceeding from that point to explain what the law is and 
why. By voting on issues, a multimember court announces 
discrete holdings that can be applied in later cases. 
There is thus an obvious reason to vote on a case’s 
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disposition based on the Court’s resolution of each relevant 
issue—to align rationale and outcome.  A related reason to do 
so is that voting paradoxes often arise because of the 
operation of the final-judgment rule.  Nash, supra, at 84-85.  
Because legal rulings are usually not appealable before final 
judgments in most jurisdictions, appeals are more likely to 
present multiple issues that can create paradoxes, whereas if 
we heard appeals piecemeal, far less opportunity for voting 
problems would arise.  The final-judgment rule is sound 
because it supports efficient resolution of cases at little cost: 
claims of reversible error can be preserved and, as a general 
matter, the litigant who is right on the law will prevail.   
But that is not true if we allow the final judgment rule 
to affect our substantive resolution of the issues in a case.  
Take this case.  Imagine that the final-judgment rule did not 
apply, and Hanover prevailed on antitrust standing in the 
District Court.  Village then appealed, and we affirmed (over 
my dissent).  Then, on remand, Village prevailed on the 
Noerr–Pennington issue in the District Court, and Hanover 
appealed and won (over Judge Greenberg’s dissent).  There 
would be no doubt in that case that Hanover would have 
properly won its appeals even though two judges thought at 
different phases of the litigation it should have lost, and no 
justification for the final-judgment rule requires a contrary 
bottom-line outcome in such a seriatim case.  To generalize 
from that example, the final-judgment rule helps create the 
voting paradox without providing a satisfactory rationale for 
the usual practice of outcome voting, thus posing the question 
of why, other than habit, we typically vote by outcome. 
Judge Greenberg points out that we could avoid the 
voting paradox if I didn’t bother to reach the Noerr–
Pennington issue.  If so, a majority would conclude that 
Hanover had standing, and then a majority would conclude 
that Hanover loses but without a majority supporting any 
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particular reason for its loss.  This avoids the problem of an 
incoherent precedent but replaces it with no opinion to 
provide even the hint of a rationale.  Arguably, no reasoning 
is an improvement over reasoning that contradicts a 
judgment, but, as Judge Greenberg notes, we never have to 
issue an opinion.  We could just issue judgment orders 
without reasoning in every case and save everyone a lot of 
time and paper.  In my view, we issue judgments 
accompanied by reasoned opinions because the rule of law 
ought neither to be nor appear to be arbitrary.  It follows that 
judgments should be supported by reasoning, that the 
reasoning should actually support the outcome in a particular 
case, and that in this case I should yield to my colleagues on 
antitrust standing and vote on the Noerr-Pennington issue that 
follows. 
2. A Multimember Court: Deliberative 
Body or so Many Noses to Count? 
The possibilities of issue and outcome voting expose a 
tension between the independence of individual judges and 
our membership on multimember panels of multimember 
courts.  As we are independent, it could be thought that a 
litigant is entitled to the sum of independent votes in its favor 
and that a judge should not change his or her vote out of 
deference to colleagues’ shared views.  The widely (though 
not universally) accepted practice of writing separate opinions 
when a judge disagrees with another’s analysis supports this 
view of voting one’s views alone. 
There are at least two reasons why appellate courts 
should be deemed to act as an entity reasoning through the 
case issue by issue rather than a collection of individual 
judges with a judgment reflecting a vote tally divorced from 
the reasoning of the majority of the court.  The first is the 
nature of multimember appellate courts as collegial, and not 
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just redundant, enterprises.  Kornhauser and Sager explain 
that redundant and collegial enterprises “aim to produce 
performances that could in principle represent the unenhanced 
effort of a single person, but to bring that performance closer 
to the ideal.”  Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, 
The One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81 
Calif. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1993).  Redundant enterprises “rely on an 
external structure of multiple independent efforts.”  Id.  For 
example, in the case of gymnastics judges, “[e]ach judge 
ranks the performance before her without consulting her 
peers, and the rankings are aggregated by rule.”  Id.  By 
contrast, collegial bodies “are like team enterprises in that 
each participant must consider and respond to her colleagues 
as she performs her tasks.  Collaboration and deliberation are 
the trademarks of collegial enterprise.”  Id.  “While 
interaction and exchange are irrelevant or even antithetical to 
redundant enterprises, they are crucial to collegial enterprises, 
and the product of a collegial enterprise often belongs to that 
enterprise in a uniquely collective way.”  Id. at 4–5.  
Appellate courts are collegial enterprises.  Judges 
collaborate on and deliberate about cases and issues at all 
levels of the appeals process, from deciding whether to hold 
oral argument to conferencing to circulating opinions.  At the 
end of the process a judgment of the Court typically emerges 
supported by an opinion.  In some sense that product is akin 
to what a team produces.  “Team enterprises do not merely 
multiply product or amplify effort: they transform the 
performance into something that only a group could have 
produced.”  Id. at 3.  Put another way, while an individual 
judge could do the job of an appellate court, the process of 
multimember panels produces a product that is typically 
better qualitatively than what an individual appellate judge 
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could do.  The whole is greater than the sum of its parts.6  
In some cases, then, outcome voting lessens the value 
of an appellate court’s deliberative process.  If judges engage 
in issue voting, there are multiple deliberations and votes; that 
is, there are deliberations and votes on each issue.  A judge is 
not effectively on the sideline for disagreeing with the 
majority on a threshold issue.  Applying issue voting in this 
case, for example, I reach the Noerr–Pennington issue, even 
though I perceive no standing, because my individual view on 
the antitrust standing question is subsumed (despite my filing 
a dissent) into that of the panel; we act as a single deliberative 
body in a process that produces a judgment that depends on 
the majority’s reasoning (whatever the composition of that 
majority) at each step of the process.  With outcome voting, 
by contrast, though judges deliberate on separate issues 
(unless they decide not to reach them), a judgment depends 
not on reasoning but a tallying of who should win were each 
judge to vote a result without reasons.  There is, therefore, 
less of an opportunity for synthesis or transformation of each 
judge’s reasoning into the larger whole.  This provides the 
answer to Judge Greenberg’s lack of “understand[ing] why 
the circumstance that we are all on the panel should lead to a 
different result than that which would be reached individually 
by a majority of the panel.”  Greenberg Op. at 29.  The result 
should be different because we sit on a panel. 
Second, issue voting treats judges as 
interchangeable—the premise of the black robe and an 
assumption on which our legal system is based.  In our case, 
for example, Hanover prevails because two out of three 
judges find antitrust standing for the plaintiff and two out of 
                                                 
6  This is not to say that judges should not dissent. In that 
sense, courts are not fully team enterprises. 
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three judges find no immunity for the defendant.  Voting by 
issue better reflects our role as members of a single 
deliberative body striving to craft a sensible corpus juris.  As 
noted above, if we voted by outcome, the precedential value 
of this case would be unclear if the same set of facts came 
before us (or a district court) a second time.  For a body like a 
court that has no means to enforce its mandate other than 
persuasion, it is of great concern that “in cases where the 
doctrinal paradox arises, judgment and reason are 
immediately and inexorably pulled apart, to the potential 
detriment of the orderly development of legal doctrine.”  
Kornhauser & Sager, supra, at 5.    
C. Arguments to the Contrary are Not Persuasive. 
Thoughtful proponents of an outcome-based voting 
protocol argue that it promotes principled (i.e., not strategic) 
identification of issues and, at least in some cases, also 
promotes principled resolution of those issues.  See 
Abramowicz & Stearns, supra, at 56–58; John M. Rogers, 
“Issue Voting” by Multimember Appellate Courts: A 
Response to Some Radical Proposals, 49 Vand. L. Rev. 997, 
1002 (1996); Maxwell L. Stearns, How Outcome Voting 
Promotes Principled Issue Identification: A Reply to 
Professor John Rogers and Others, 49 Vand. L. Rev. 1045, 
1050 (1996).  In short, these scholars argue that if appellate 
courts vote by issue, judges and litigants will have an  
incentive to identify and sequence legal issues in 
disingenuous ways to cobble together shifting majorities that 
will eventually support their favored positions.  By contrast, if 
the only vote is on the outcome, each judge will present the 
issues in the case as he or she actually views them without 
regard to the potential gains from gamesmanship in framing 
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issues.7   
There are a number of replies to this argument.  First, 
professional norms of the bench and bar go a long way in 
preventing deceptive strategies in brief- and opinion-writing.  
Second, it is unclear to me that the resolution of issues in an 
outcome-vote is more principled than in an issue vote; indeed, 
a principal problem with outcome voting is that occasionally 
                                                 
7 Judge Greenberg also relies on an article by then-Professor 
Rogers, who concluded that “over 150 Supreme Court cases 
involving plurality majority opinions indicate that a justice 
should not [aggregate votes by issue and therefore] defer to a 
majority that disagrees on a dispositive issue.”  John M. 
Rogers, “I Vote This Way Because I’m Wrong”: The Supreme 
Court Justice as Epimenides, 79 Ky. L.J. 439, 459 (1990–91).  
But not one of that large number of cases actually purports to 
say how a judge “should” vote.  Moreover, by Judge Rogers’ 
own count, only between fourteen and sixteen cases involved 
situations where the justices voted by outcome when an issue-
vote would have yielded a different result.  Id. at 448 & n.24.  
In light of the three cases where justices voted by issue and 
the Supreme Court’s silence in all cases on whether issue- or 
outcome-based voting is preferable, I do not see how we can 
fairly understand the Court to have settled the question of the 
proper voting protocol.  Kornhauser & Sager, supra, at 57 
(“Current appellate practice with regard to paradoxical cases 
is in shambles.  The Supreme Court, in particular, has been 
unmindful of the existence of the paradox, even when 
confronted with cases whose dispositions turn on the choice 
of alternative voting protocols.”).  
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issues are left entirely unresolved.  For example, Wedderburn 
v. I.N.S., 215 F.3d 795, 801 (7th Cir. 2000), applied Miller, 
523 U.S. 420 (where, as noted above, majorities on every 
issue undermined the judgment), to reject a similar challenge 
to a different statute.  In Wedderburn, the Court reasoned not 
by legal analysis but by prediction about the votes of 
individual justices.  215 F.3d at 801.  Finally, each judge on a 
multimember panel always has to vote ultimately on the 
outcome of a case; what is debatable is whether that vote 
should be based on the way majorities of judges resolve 
individual issues or how the individual judge views the 
preferred outcome.  In some cases, like this one, where all 
agree on what the issues are, each relevant one is dispositive, 
and they all arise in an agreed-on logical sequence, issue-
voting strikes me as preferable.  But I do not mean to promise 
that I will always vote by issue, and I do not mean to suggest 
that my colleagues should or must follow my lead.  As we 
have seen, Supreme Court justices are inconsistent in their 
voting bases, and no source of law resolves the question of 
how to vote.  And in some cases, especially capital ones, the 
practical implications of a judgment—life or death— may be 
more important than the choice of one voting protocol over 
another.  See David Post & Steven C. Salop, Rowing Against 
the Tidewater: A Theory of Voting by Multijudge Panels, 80 
Geo. L.J. 743, 761 (1992). 
D. The Next Case: Toward a Voting Protocol  
  Protocol 
As we have seen, appellate judges have little to guide 
their discretion in choosing a voting protocol.  This case 
prompts me to argue for one guidepost:  when an appellant 
raises “arguments that would constitute independent appeals 
were interlocutory appeals permissible,” issue voting is 
preferable.  Nash, supra, at 147–48.   
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Because in this case I view a coherent precedent from 
our Court as more valuable than a resolution in favor of the 
party I would have sided with were I deciding this case by 
myself, and because all agree the two issues presented here 
are easily separated, I concur with Judge Fuentes in a 
disposition that ultimately favors Hanover. 
IV. Conclusion 
Hanover should lack antitrust standing because it has 
not suffered antitrust injury within the meaning of the 
Supreme Court’s exposition of that term.  However, I am 
outvoted on this issue, which sets the precedent for our Court 
and the predicate for addressing the remaining issue (Noerr–
Pennington).  It has divided my colleagues, and thus my vote 
is needed to resolve it.  I agree with Judge Fuentes that 
Noerr–Pennington poses no bar to relief at this stage in the 
litigation.  Although I would affirm the District Court on 
antitrust standing grounds, I yield to my colleagues’ 
resolution of that issue and vote to vacate and remand on the 
lack of a Noerr-Pennington defense to Village. 
Re:  Hanover 3201 Realty, LLC v. Village Supermarkets,  
        No. 14-4183 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 I concur with and join in Sections I, the background 
section, and II.A., the antitrust standing section, of Judge 
Fuentes’s opinion.  Thus, I agree with his conclusion in Section 
II.A. that plaintiff, Hanover 3201 Realty, LLC (“3201 Realty”), 
has antitrust standing in the full-service supermarket market but 
not in the full-service supermarket rental space market.  I cannot 
agree, however, with Judge Fuentes’s opinion to the extent that I 
believe it expands the sham exception to Noerr-Pennington 
immunity.  I decline to join in this aspect of Judge Fuentes’s 
opinion because:  (1) 3201 Realty has not properly preserved the 
issue; (2) no court of which I am aware has applied the 
expanded exception in circumstances comparable to those here; 
and (3) the expansion of the sham exception comes with a 
questionable pedigree.  I therefore conclude that the legal 
challenges to 3201 Realty’s development project that Village 
Supermarkets, Inc. (“Village”) brought on behalf of itself and 
Hanover and Horsehill Development LLC fall within the 
antitrust immunity afforded to petitioning activity under the 
Noerr-Pennington doctrine.1  In light of this conclusion and 
Judge Ambro’s conclusion that 3201 Realty does not have 
antitrust standing, two of the three members of this panel believe 
that the District Court correctly dismissed the complaint.   
 In coming to my conclusion that the District Court 
correctly dismissed the complaint I recognize that a majority of 
                                                 
1 I refer to Village and Hanover and Horsehill Development 
LLC together as defendants. 
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the panel, Judge Fuentes and I, believe that the District Court in 
part erred in concluding that 3201 Realty lacks antitrust 
standing.  But that error does not require us to reverse the 
Court’s judgment because an appellate court may affirm an 
order granting a motion to dismiss on “any ground supported by 
the record.”  Hildebrand v. Allegheny Cnty., 757 F.3d 99, 104 
(3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 
236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999)), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 1398 (2015).  
Here, the opinions of the members of the panel demonstrate that 
a majority of the panel believe that there is such support in the 
record because I accept defendants’ contention that the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine immunizes them from antitrust liability for 
their allegedly anticompetitive judicial and administrative 
challenges to 3201 Realty’s development project, and Judge 
Ambro accepts defendants’ contention that 3201 Realty did not 
have antitrust standing.2  Thus, I reiterate that Judge Ambro and 
I believe that the District Court reached the correct result, 
though in part on a basis that differs from that on which the 
Court relied.  Accordingly, though the panel is reversing, it 
should be affirming. 
 
 
I.  THE NOERR-PENNINGTON DOCTRINE IMMUNIZES 
                                                 
2 Defendants raised this argument both in the District Court and 
in their answering brief on appeal.  3201 Realty failed to address 
the merits of the argument in its reply brief, but we afforded it 
an opportunity to do so in a supplemental reply brief and it did 
so. 
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     DEFENDANTS’ CONDUCT FROM ANTRITRUST        
     LIABILITY. 
  A. Relevant Law 
 The Noerr-Pennington doctrine draws its name from the 
Supreme Court’s opinions in Eastern Railroad Presidents 
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 81 S.Ct. 
523 (1961), and United Mine Workers of America v. 
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 85 S.Ct. 1585 (1965).  It derives in 
part from the First Amendment right to petition the government. 
 Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 
1749, 1757 (2014); BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB., 536 U.S. 
516, 524-25, 122 S.Ct. 2390, 2395-96 (2002).  Under the 
doctrine, petitioners for “government . . . redress are generally 
immune from antitrust liability” when defending against 
antitrust claims predicated on this petitioning activity.  Prof’l 
Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 
U.S. 49, 56, 113 S.Ct. 1920, 1926 (1993) (“PRE”); see A.D. 
Bedell Wholesale Co. v. Philip Morris Inc., 263 F.3d 239, 250 
(3d Cir. 2001).  The doctrine applies not only to lobbying 
activity but also “to efforts to influence administrative agency 
action and efforts to access the court system.”  Santana Prods. 
Inc. v. Bobrick Washroom Equip., Inc., 401 F.3d 123, 131 n.13 
(3d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted); see Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. 
Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510, 92 S.Ct. 609, 611-12 
(1972); Cheminor Drugs, Ltd. v. Ethyl Corp., 168 F.3d 119, 122 
(3d Cir. 1999).  Indeed, “[c]alling concerns about a proposed 
development to the attention of the responsible state agencies 
[and courts] lies at the core of privileged activity.”  Herr v. 
Pequea Twp., 274 F.3d 109, 121 (3d Cir. 2001). 
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 3201 Realty argues that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine 
does not immunize defendants for their conduct because the 
allegedly anticompetitive legal challenges to the development 
project fall within the so-called “sham” exception to the 
doctrine.  In PRE, the Supreme Court established a two-prong 
test for determining the applicability of this exception including 
both objective and subjective components.  See 508 U.S. at 60-
61, 113 S.Ct. at 1928.  Under the objective prong, the plaintiff 
must show that the defendant’s petitioning was “objectively 
baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could 
realistically expect success on the merits.”  BE & K Constr., 536 
U.S. at 526, 122 S.Ct. at 2396 (quoting PRE, 508 U.S. at 60, 113 
S.Ct. at 1928).  A plaintiff cannot make this showing if the 
defendant’s petitioning activity has succeeded as “a successful 
‘effort to influence governmental action . . . certainly cannot be 
characterized as a sham.’”  PRE, 508 U.S. at 58, 113 S.Ct. at 
1927 (alteration in original) (quoting Allied Tube & Conduit 
Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 502, 108 S.Ct. 1931, 
1938 (1988)).   
 On the other hand, even if a defendant’s petitioning 
activity was unsuccessful, that failure does not prove that it did 
not have an objective basis for the activity.  See id. at 60 n.5, 
113 S.Ct. at 1928 n.5; Herr, 274 F.3d at 119.  Moreover, “even 
when the law or the facts appear questionable or unfavorable at 
the outset, a party may have an entirely reasonable ground for 
bringing suit.”  PRE, 508 U.S. at 60 n.5, 113 S.Ct. at 1928 n.5 
(quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 
422, 98 S.Ct. 694, 701 (1978)).  The second, subjective prong 
for establishing the sham exception to Noerr-Pennington 
immunity, comes into play only if the plaintiff first makes a 
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showing satisfying the exception’s objective prong.  See PRE, 
508 U.S. at 60, 113 S.Ct. at 1928; Cheminor, 168 F.3d at 123 
n.10.  Accordingly, a defendant’s anticompetitive intent in 
engaging in petitioning activity is immaterial if it had probable 
cause for its activity.  See PRE, 508 U.S. at 62, 113 S.Ct. at 
1929. 
 In an effort to avoid the need to satisfy PRE’s threshold 
objective prong, 3201 Realty contends that the PRE test applies 
only where the defendants institute a single legal action and not 
where, as here, the defendants brought multiple legal challenges 
to the plaintiff’s enterprise.  3201 Realty supports this position 
by pointing to cases from other courts of appeals holding that 
“where the defendant is accused of bringing a whole series of 
legal proceedings,” “the question is not whether any one of them 
has merit -- some may turn out to, just as a matter of chance -- 
but whether they are brought pursuant to a policy of starting 
legal proceedings without regard to the merits and for the 
purpose of injuring a market rival.”  USS-POSCO Indus. v. 
Contra Costa Cnty. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, AFL-CIO, 
31 F.3d 800, 811 (9th Cir. 1994); accord Waugh Chapel S., LLC 
v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 27, 728 
F.3d 354, 363-64 (4th Cir. 2013); Primetime 24 Joint Venture v. 
Nat’l Broad., Co., 219 F.3d 92, 101 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 Judge Ambro and Judge Fuentes accept 3201 Realty’s 
argument circumventing the need to satisfy the objective prong 
of the dual-prong PRE test.  I believe, however, that the 
argument should fail for at least three independent reasons.  
First, 3201 Realty did not raise this argument until it filed its 
supplemental reply brief in this Court.  Beyond a mere “failure 
to cite particular cases within its broader argument for the sham 
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exception,” majority typescript at 30 n.12, 3201 Realty 
conceded before the District Court that it had to satisfy PRE’s 
two-prong test and first show that any allegedly anticompetitive 
“lawsuit or other petitioning activity [was] objectively baseless,” 
Pl.’s Br. in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 9 (citing PRE, 508 U.S. 
at 60, 113 S.Ct. at 1928).  I therefore would hold that 3201 
Realty has waived any argument excusing it from having to 
establish that defendants’ actions were objectively baseless.  See 
Erdman v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 582 F.3d 500, 507 n.2 (3d Cir. 
2009) (holding that plaintiff waived argument by conceding the 
point at issue on the appeal in the district court and explaining 
that her discovery of the argument upon “‘further reading’ while 
preparing [her] appeal” did not justify overlooking the waiver); 
Bryant v. Military Dep’t of Miss., 597 F.3d 678, 694 (5th Cir. 
2010) (holding that by not raising it before the district court, 
plaintiff waived the argument that “the ‘objectively baseless’ 
standard ought to be applied in some different, and presumably 
favorable way in this case because multiple lawsuits were filed 
against him”). 
 Second, even putting aside the waiver problem, the very 
case law applying the alternative test for which 3201 Realty 
advocates, i.e., not applying the PRE two-prong test which 
includes an objective component in situations in which a 
defendant has instituted a series of legal actions, demonstrates 
that the single lawsuit and three administrative challenges that 
defendants initiated do not rise to the level of “a whole series of 
legal proceedings” so as to trigger the applicability of the 
alternative test.  See In re Flonase Antitrust Litig., 795 F. Supp. 
2d 300, 309 n.10 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (“No court has applied the 
USS-POSCO test to a ‘series’ of five petitions . . . .”); see also 
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ERBE Elektromedizin GmbH v. Canady Tech. LLC, 629 F.3d 
1278, 1291-92 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (even assuming alternative test 
applied, no “series” based on defendant filing three lawsuits); 
Amarel v. Connell, 102 F.3d 1494, 1519 (9th Cir. 1996) (no 
“series” where defendants initiated two lawsuits and 
administrative proceedings); Ludwig v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 350, 365 n.33 (Ct. App. 1995) (“[A] total of four 
activities, two of which are not meritless as a matter of law, 
cannot constitute such a pattern [of baseless opposition].”).  
Thus, while Judge Ambro and Judge Fuentes adopt the test of 
other courts of appeals limiting this application of PRE, it seems 
to me that they do not correctly apply the case law based on that 
test, declaring instead that in the present circumstances, though 
not in others, four actions qualify as a “series.”3  Majority 
typescript at 33-34.  In reality, the four legal challenges that 
defendants initiated pale in comparison to the 29 in USS-
POSCO, 31 F.3d at 811; the 14 in Waugh Chapel, 728 F.3d at 
365; and the thousands in Primetime 24, 219 F.3d at 101. 
 Third, even overlooking both 3201 Realty’s waiver of a 
challenge to the applicability of the two-prong PRE test and the 
consideration that the courts that have adopted the alternative 
intent-based test would not apply it in the circumstances we 
face, I harbor doubts about whether the courts limiting the 
applicability of PRE have identified a proper exception to that 
case’s two-part test.  This purported exception rests on a case on 
which Judge Ambro and Judge Fuentes heavily rely decided 
                                                 
3 As I explain below there now is an additional case that Village 
has initiated to consider.  See infra note 5.  But the addition of 
this case does not change my conclusion. 
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prior to PRE in which the Supreme Court explained: “One 
claim, which a court or agency may think baseless, may go 
unnoticed; but a pattern of baseless, repetitive claims may 
emerge which leads the factfinder to conclude that the 
administrative and judicial processes have been abused.”  Cal. 
Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 513, 92 S.Ct. at 613.  Yet it seems to 
me that the Court’s reference to “a pattern of baseless, repetitive 
claims” makes clear that this language comes into play only 
where a plaintiff first can satisfy what ultimately became PRE’s 
first prong; otherwise, the Court’s use of the word “baseless” 
would serve no purpose.  But the use of “baseless” did serve a 
purpose because the Court in PRE pointed to this very language 
as demonstrating that “[n]othing in California Motor Transport 
retreated” from “an indispensable objective component” in 
establishing the sham exception.  508 U.S. at 58, 113 S.Ct. at 
1927. 
 In a ruling employing the understanding of PRE that I 
think is appropriate, we applied the objective prong to uphold a 
claim of Noerr-Pennington immunity in a case similar to this 
one where the defendants challenged a plaintiff’s land 
development project in multiple judicial and administrative 
proceedings.  See Herr, 274 F.3d at 115-16, 118-19.  Other 
courts also have rejected the proposed exception to the PRE test 
advanced here that would dispense with the need to show that 
the defendant’s activity lacked an objectively reasonable basis.  
See Travelers Express Co. v. Am. Express Integrated Payment 
Sys. Inc., 80 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1042 (D. Minn. 1999) (applying 
PRE rather than Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s test 
even though defendant filed “a series of allegedly meritless 
suits”); Christian Mem’l Cultural Ctr., Inc. v. Mich. Funeral 
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Dirs. Ass’n, 998 F. Supp. 772, 777 n.2 (E.D. Mich. 1998) 
(“[T]he courts in this circuit that have confronted similar issues 
[of whether an exception to PRE exists where the defendant 
initiated multiple lawsuits] have declined to read [PRE] so 
narrowly.” (citation omitted)). 
 I appreciate the animating concern of other courts of 
appeals that an antitrust defendant’s fortuitous success in a small 
number of lawsuits should not automatically immunize the 
defendant from the antitrust consequences of initiating a whole 
series of anticompetitive legal challenges.  See Waugh Chapel, 
728 F.3d at 365; Primetime 24, 219 F.3d at 101; USS-POSCO, 
31 F.3d at 811.  But we should not alleviate this concern by 
excusing a plaintiff from having to show the objective 
baselessness of even a single action brought by the defendant.  
After all, if Noerr-Pennington immunity shields objectively 
reasonable actions when considered individually, it should 
continue to shield them when they are aggregated.  Cf. 
Pennington, 381 U.S. at 670, 85 S.Ct. at 1593 (holding that 
immunity extends to petitioning conduct “either standing alone 
or as part of a broader scheme”). 
 Judge Ambro and Judge Fuentes reason that the 
alternative test makes more sense when dealing with multiple 
legal challenges because having a larger sample of challenges 
than a single challenge enables the court to better “assess 
whether a defendant has misused the governmental process to 
curtail competition.”  Majority typescript at 32.  Yet this 
approach treats PRE’s objective prong as more akin to an 
evidentiary rule of thumb for determining whether the defendant 
possessed an anticompetitive purpose, rather than the 
independent and threshold requirement that it unmistakably 
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represents.  See 508 U.S. at 57, 113 S.Ct. at 1926 (“[A]n 
objectively reasonable effort to litigate cannot be sham 
regardless of subjective intent.”); id. at 59-60; 113 S.Ct. at 1928 
(“We [earlier] dispelled the notion that an antitrust plaintiff 
could prove a sham merely by showing that its competitor’s 
‘purposes were to delay [the plaintiff’s] entry into the market 
and even to deny it a meaningful access to the appropriate . . . 
administrative and legislative fora.’” (second and third 
alterations in original) (quoting Columbia v. Omni Outdoor 
Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 381, 111 S.Ct. 1344, 1354 (1991)).  
Perhaps for this reason, some courts applying an approach 
similar to that of Judge Ambro and Judge Fuentes have 
preserved the need for showing the objective baselessness of the 
defendant’s action as a prerequisite for establishing the sham 
exception.  See, e.g., In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust 
Litig., 335 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 1367 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (rejecting 
claim of sham litigation because “none of the lawsuits, 
individually, can be considered objectively baseless”); Gen-
Probe, Inc. v. Amoco Corp., 926 F. Supp. 948, 959 (S.D. Cal. 
1996) (“[U]nder either the PRE or the USS-POSCO test, [the 
plaintiff’s] claims against [the defendants] must demonstrate 
objective baselessness.”). 
 When I consider these questions regarding the legal 
support for abandoning a threshold objective baselessness 
requirement, I cannot acquiesce in the adoption of a test where 
the argument supporting the adoption has not been advanced 
properly and the test is being applied in circumstances beyond 
those recognized by other courts that have adopted the test 
abandoning the objective component of PRE.  I therefore would 
hold that 3201 Realty cannot circumvent a Noerr-Pennington 
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immunity defense without first showing that defendants’ legal 
challenges were objectively baseless.4 
                                                 
4 I agree with Judge Ambro and Judge Fuentes that the 
circumstance that some of defendants’ legal actions are ongoing 
does not preclude application of the sham exception, although I 
do so based on Supreme Court precedent and not based on the 
“prospective” character of the alternative test.  Majority 
typescript at 37 n.14.  In Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 
U.S. 623, 97 S.Ct. 2881 (1977), the Court faced the question of 
whether a district court could enjoin an ongoing state court 
proceeding that allegedly violated federal antitrust law.  The 
Court fractured into three opinions, none of which obtained a 
majority.  See id. at 626, 97 S.Ct. at 2885 (plurality opinion of 
Rehnquist, J.); id. at 643, 97 S.Ct. at 2893 (Blackmun, J., 
concurring in result); id. at 645, 97 S.Ct. at 2894 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).  Nevertheless, although a majority of the Court 
concluded that the Anti-Injunction Act barred the district court 
from enjoining the state court proceeding at issue, all nine 
justices either explicitly or implicitly acknowledged that 
plaintiffs can seek some form of relief, such as damages or 
injunctions against future legal actions, based on ongoing sham 
proceedings brought in violation of the antitrust laws.  See id. at 
635 n.6, 637 n.8, 97 S.Ct. at 2889 n.6, 2890 n.8 (plurality 
opinion of Rehnquist, J.); id. at 644, 97 S.Ct. at 2894 
(Blackmun, J., concurring in result); id. at 653-54, 97 S.Ct. at 
2899 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Indeed, six of the justices 
declared that, in appropriate circumstances, such antitrust relief 
could include an injunction against the ongoing sham 
proceedings themselves.  See id. at 644, 97 S.Ct. at 2894 
(Blackmun, J., concurring in result); id. at 654, 660, 97 S.Ct. at 
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  B. Application of PRE to Present Case 
 I now turn to the question of whether 3201 Realty can 
show that defendants’ activities were objectively baseless.  I 
initially point out that 3201 Realty arguably has waived this 
issue, which is distinct from the question of whether to apply the 
alternative test that does not require objective baselessness, by 
not adequately arguing it on appeal.  3201 Realty’s 
supplemental reply brief starts from the premise that the 
alternative test to PRE applies but does not assert that 
defendants’ legal challenges lacked an objectively reasonable 
basis, and only briefly suggests that defendants did not have 
standing to bring these challenges or that the challenges 
otherwise lacked merit.  See, e.g., John Wyeth & Bro. Ltd. v. 
CIGNA Int’l Corp., 119 F.3d 1070, 1076 n.6 (3d Cir. 1997) 
                                                                                                             
2899, 2902 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Subsequently, in a case 
arising under federal labor law, the Court drew on the sham 
exception to Noerr-Pennington to hold that an ongoing baseless 
lawsuit may be enjoined if it was brought for an improper 
purpose.  See Bill Johnson’s Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 
731, 744, 103 S.Ct. 2161, 2170 (1983). 
 These Supreme Court cases illustrate that a plaintiff can 
bring an antitrust claim circumventing Noerr-Pennington 
immunity by relying on the sham exception even if the allegedly 
sham legal actions remain pending.  This conclusion is logical 
given that a determination of whether anticompetitive legal 
actions fall within the sham exception turns not on their ultimate 
outcomes but on the existence of a reasonable basis (or a proper 
motive) for instituting and pursuing them in the first place.  See 
PRE, 508 U.S. at 60 n.5, 113 S.Ct. at 1928 n.5. 
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(“[A]rguments raised in passing . . . , but not squarely argued, 
are considered waived.”).  Nevertheless, I will give 3201 Realty 
the benefit of the doubt and consider the arguments that 
defendants’ actions were objectively baselessness to which it 
alluded in its supplemental reply brief.  3201 Realty simply 
cannot meet the objective baselessness standard that PRE 
recognized. 
 Where the complaint fails at least to raise a question of 
fact on a sham petitioning issue, a court may reject the claim by 
granting a motion to dismiss.  See PRE, 508 U.S. at 63, 113 
S.Ct. at 1930 (“Where, as here, there is no dispute over the 
predicate facts of the underlying legal proceeding, a court may 
decide probable cause as a matter of law.”); A.D. Bedell, 263 
F.3d at 241 (affirming dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) 
of antitrust claims based on Noerr-Pennington doctrine). 
 In arguing that defendants’ legal challenges were 
objectively baseless, 3201 Realty primarily contends that they 
lacked standing when they made these challenges.  For support, 
3201 Realty points to the decisions of the New Jersey Superior 
Court and the New Jersey Department of Environmental 
Protection (“NJDEP”) respectively concluding that Village 
lacked standing in its prerogative writs action and flood hazard 
area (“FHA”) permit challenges.  But as I already have noted, 
the ultimate failure of an underlying action does not establish its 
objective baselessness.  See PRE, 508 U.S. at 60 n.5, 113 S.Ct. 
at 1928 n.5 (“[W]hen the antitrust defendant has lost the 
underlying litigation, a court must ‘resist the understandable 
temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding’ that 
an ultimately unsuccessful ‘action must have been unreasonable 
or without foundation.’” (quoting Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 
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421-22, 98 S.Ct. at 700)); Herr, 274 F.3d at 119 (rejecting 
plaintiff’s claim of sham litigation where opinions in underlying 
actions demonstrated that courts analyzed relevant issues “with 
care and some detail” and did not consider them “frivolous”); 
Balt. Scrap Corp. v. David J. Joseph Co., 237 F.3d 394, 400 (4th 
Cir. 2001) (rejecting antitrust plaintiff’s claim of sham litigation 
notwithstanding that state court had dismissed underlying suit 
for lack of standing). 
 3201 Realty has not shown that a reasonable litigant in 
Village’s position would have perceived that it did not have a 
realistic possibility of establishing standing in the relevant 
actions.  To the contrary, the New Jersey Superior Court’s 
decision in the prerogative writs action demonstrates that a 
reasonable litigant could have perceived such a possibility in 
that case.  In particular, Village cited several cases before that 
court in support of its claim that it had standing based on its 
status as a local taxpayer.  For example, the court had stated in 
one of those cases that “[t]here is some support for the 
proposition that any local taxpayer has standing to object to a 
variance application, although the question has not clearly been 
resolved.”  Vill. Supermarket, Inc. v. Mayfair Supermarkets, 
Inc., 634 A.2d 1381, 1385 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993) 
(citing Booth v. Bd. of Adjustment of Rockaway Twp., 234 
A.2d 681, 682 (N.J. 1967)).  The Superior Court ultimately 
decided this issue against Village, but “[i]n light of the unsettled 
condition of the law,” Village had a reasonable basis for its 
position.  PRE, 508 U.S. at 65, 113 S.Ct. at 1930. 
 Similarly, in the FHA permit challenge, Village argued 
that its expected loss of business as a direct competitor of the 
proposed supermarket qualified as a sufficiently particularized 
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property interest to establish standing.  But I need look no 
further than the discussion of antitrust standing in Judge 
Fuentes’s opinion to see that status as a direct competitor 
sometimes can demonstrate a unique property interest in filing a 
legal challenge.  See, e.g., majority typescript at 26 (“Antitrust 
injury ordinarily is limited to consumers and competitors in the 
restrained market.”).  Although the NJDEP ultimately decided to 
treat Village’s business interests as equivalent to other 
generalized interests that do not support standing, the cases on 
which it relied did not involve challenges brought by 
competitors and therefore did not foreclose Village’s argument.  
Village therefore had a reasonable basis for its position in this 
action as well.  See id., 113 S.Ct. at 1931 (“Even in the absence 
of supporting authority, [the antitrust defendant] would have 
been entitled to press a novel . . . claim as long as a similarly 
situated reasonable litigant could have perceived some 
likelihood of success.”). 
 Furthermore, 3201 Realty has not demonstrated that 
Village’s argument for standing in its wetlands permit challenge 
was any weaker than the foregoing arguments for standing.  
Finally, as to the major street intersection (“MSI”) permit 
challenge, the New Jersey Department of Transportation 
(“NJDOT”) affirmatively acknowledged Village’s standing to 
raise its objections, noting that the department was “required to 
consider any relevant data, analysis, and arguments submitted 
by third parties in reaching its decisions concerning the approval 
of access permits.”  J.A. 165.  I therefore reject 3201 Realty’s 
argument that defendants’ legal challenges should be regarded 
as objectively baseless because defendants lacked standing to 
make the challenges.  See Balt. Scrap Corp., 237 F.3d at 400; 
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Liberty Lake Invs., Inc. v. Magnuson, 12 F.3d 155, 157 (9th Cir. 
1993). 
 Nor has 3201 Realty demonstrated that defendants’ 
challenges were objectively baseless on their merits.  Indeed, the 
relevant adjudicators upheld some of Village’s objections in two 
of these challenges.  In the MSI permit challenge, the NJDOT 
agreed with Village that a prior development agreement required 
3201 Realty either to construct certain highway improvements 
or negotiate a new agreement before it could proceed with its 
project.  Likewise, in the wetlands permit challenge, the NJDEP 
first “required” 3201 Realty to re-notice its application due to a 
defect that Village identified in the original application.  J.A. 
169.  Then, based on another objection raised by Village, the 
NJDEP required 3201 Realty to conduct a wildlife survey for 
the presence of an endangered species of bats before beginning 
work on the property.  Although Village did not prevail in its 
other two challenges, the Superior Court’s and the NJDEP’s 
opinions in those proceedings each addressed Village’s 
contentions “with care and some detail” and without indicating 
that those reviewing bodies considered Village’s positions 
“frivolous.”  See Herr, 274 F.3d at 119. 
In these circumstances, 3201 Realty has not shown that 
defendants’ petitioning activity was objectively baseless.  
Defendants’ conduct therefore falls within the immunity 
afforded by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, and 3201 Realty’s 
antitrust claims must fail.  Therefore, we should affirm the 
District Court’s order dismissing the complaint.  Inasmuch as I 
have reached this conclusion, I do not address the other 
arguments that defendants raise in support of the District Court’s 
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order dismissing the complaint.5 
 
II.  JUDGE AMBRO’S AND MY AGREEMENT THAT THE 
DISTRICT COURT ENTERED THE CORRECT JUDGMENT 
MANDATES AN AFFIRMANCE. 
 As I stated at the outset of this opinion, Judge Ambro and 
I agree that the District Court correctly dismissed the complaint. 
 Judge Ambro reaches this conclusion because he believes that 
3201 Realty did not have the antitrust standing necessary to 
bring this action, and I do so because I believe that defendants 
were immune under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.  A 
reasonable observer might think it is obvious that the 
inescapable consequence of this agreement is that we must 
affirm the District Court’s judgment dismissing the complaint.  
But Judge Ambro avoids this outcome by regarding himself as 
“bound by the majority’s [Judge Fuentes’s and Judge 
Greenberg’s] opinion on antitrust standing despite [his] 
disagreement with it,”  Ambro typescript at 11, an application of 
the principle of stare decisis.  He therefore effectively switches 
                                                 
5 On September 10, 2015, 3201 Realty’s attorneys filed a letter 
with attachments pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 28(j) indicating 
that Village’s chief operating officer on August 12, 2015, filed a 
complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey seeking an 
injunction stopping the clearing work on 3201 Realty’s property 
on the ground that 3201 Realty obtained its wetland permit by 
fraud.  To the best of my knowledge this case has not been 
resolved so I do not take it into account as I do not know if the 
suit is objectively baseless. 
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what should be his vote from an affirmance of the Court’s order 
to a reversal.  As a result a majority of the panel consisting of 
Judge Fuentes and Judge Ambro announce the Court’s judgment 
based on the following shifting majorities as to individual 
issues: (1) Judge Fuentes’s and my view that 3201 Realty has 
antitrust standing and (2) Judge Fuentes’s and Judge Ambro’s 
view that 3201 Realty’s complaint overcomes a Noerr-
Pennington defense.  I regard it as ironical that even though I 
believe we should affirm the judgment of the District Court, my 
view on an issue on which I would not decide the case is a factor 
leading to its reversal.  Indeed, if I only stated my views on the 
Noerr-Pennington issue, then for certain we would be affirming 
because Judge Ambro surely would not have seen himself as 
bound by Judge Fuentes’s views if they stood alone.  But I took 
a position on standing because courts usually if not always 
decide whether a plaintiff has standing before they consider the 
merits of a case. 
 Although it is not my place to tell Judge Ambro how and 
on what issues to vote, I write here to express my view that a 
multimember panel should reach the result that follows from the 
independent views of its members.  Judge Ambro’s willingness 
to be bound by the Fuentes-Greenberg majority’s position on 
antitrust standing trumps his own conclusion on the standing 
issue and runs counter to the longstanding and widespread 
practice of the federal courts of appeals of counting judges’ 
views as to outcome and not as to individual issues.  Although 
some scholars have criticized this prevailing practice, critics and 
proponents alike acknowledge its acceptance among the courts.  
See David S. Cohen, The Precedent-Based Voting Paradox, 90 
B.U. L. Rev. 183, 222 (2010) (“[T]he [Supreme] Court currently 
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uses outcome voting to reach a result, as it votes on the outcome 
and then the Justices write their opinions to support the 
outcome.”); Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The 
One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81 Cal. L. 
Rev. 1, 31 (1993) (“[T]he case-by-case protocol has been the 
encompassing norm of the Court throughout its existence.”); 
Jonathan Remy Nash, A Context-Sensitive Voting Protocol 
Paradigm for Multimember Courts, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 75, 86 
(2003) (“[T]he standard voting protocol is generally to 
determine the ultimate outcome in a case . . . based upon each 
judge’s views as to the outcome in the case.”); David Post & 
Steven C. Salop, Rowing Against the Tidewater: A Theory of 
Voting by Multijudge Panels, 80 Geo. L.J. 743, 750 (1992) (“It 
is clear that courts most frequently utilize outcome-voting.”); 
John M. Rogers, “Issue Voting” by Multimember Appellate 
Courts: A Response to Some Radical Proposals, 49 Vand. L. 
Rev. 997, 998 (1996) (“[T]he overwhelming practice of the 
justices on the Court has been to vote for the consequence of the 
individual justice’s own reasoning.”); Maxwell L. Stearns, 
Standing and Social Choice: Historical Evidence, 144 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 309, 313-14 (1995) (“Within particular cases, the Court -- 
along with virtually all appellate courts -- employs case-by-case, 
rather than issue-by-issue, decisionmaking.”). 
 This practice of outcome voting comports with the 
general primacy that our law affords to judgments over 
opinions.  See Jennings v. Stephens, 135 S.Ct. 793, 799 (2015); 
Edward A. Hartnett, A Matter of Judgment, Not a Matter of 
Opinion, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 123, 127-34 (1999).  It is well 
established that we review a district court’s judgment, not its 
opinion.  See Jennings, 135 S.Ct. at 799; Blunt v. Lower Merion 
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Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 303 n.73 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 
135 S.Ct. 1738 (2015).  Just as this principle requires us to 
affirm a district court’s judgment even if that court’s reasoning 
differs from our own, it also should lead us to affirm even if our 
respective grounds for doing so diverge.  See Blunt, 767 F.3d at 
303 n.73 (affirming district court’s order even though only 
Judge Greenberg agreed with that court’s rationale because 
Judge Ambro reached same disposition on other grounds).   
 In view of the primacy of judgments over opinions, we 
may enter judgments without even issuing opinions.  See, e.g., 
Quaciari v. Allstate Ins. Co., 172 F.3d 860 (3d Cir. 1998); 
Hoover v. Watson, 74 F.3d 1226 (3d Cir. 1995); see also Fed. R. 
App. P. 36.  In fact, until some years ago this Court regularly 
disposed of appeals by issuing judgment orders without 
accompanying opinions, sometimes even in complex cases.  
Indeed, our internal operating procedures still authorize the use 
of judgment orders to announce the outcome of a case though 
the practice of using judgment orders has fallen into disuse.  3d 
Cir. I.O.P. 6.1.  And in cases that do result in the issuance of 
opinions, both the Supreme Court and this Court issue the 
judgment supported by the independent views of a majority of 
the judges even if a majority does not coalesce around a single 
rationale.  See, e.g., Kerry v. Din, 135 S.Ct. 2128, 2131 (2015) 
(plurality opinion); United States v. Dupree, 617 F.3d 724, 726 
(3d Cir. 2010); Cruz v. Chesapeake Shipping, Inc., 932 F.2d 
218, 220 (3d Cir. 1991) (Rosenn, J., announcing the judgment of 
the court); cf. Michael v. Horn, 459 F.3d 411, 429 n.18 (3d Cir. 
2006) (Greenberg, J., concurring) (“[I]t is always true that even 
though judges agree on the appropriate outcome of a case, they 
would not write identical opinions.”).  “That the court is able to 
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issue any judgment at all in such cases clearly demonstrates that 
outcome-voting has been utilized.”  Post & Salop, Rowing 
Against the Tidewater, supra, at 750.  Accordingly, “the 
outcome of a case in a multimember court depends on the tally 
of votes concerning the judgment even if the tally of votes 
concerning each issue resolved by opinion would logically 
produce a different conclusion.”  Hartnett, supra, at 134. 
 Judge Ambro declines to follow this accepted practice of 
independent outcome voting because of the “voting paradox” 
that arises if issue-by-issue resolution of a case would lead to a 
conclusion that is opposite to that reached based on outcome 
voting.  But in the absence of the voting paradox it would not 
matter if a court decided a case on an issue-by-issue or outcome 
basis.  Moreover, the Supreme Court repeatedly and consistently 
has utilized outcome voting even in cases implicating the voting 
paradox.  See, e.g., Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 118 S.Ct. 
1428 (1998); Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 
110 S.Ct. 2323 (1990); Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. of D.C. v. Tidewater 
Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 69 S.Ct. 1173 (1949); see also 
Cohen, supra, at 183-84 (noting existence of more than 30 such 
cases in Supreme Court history).  Moreover, as Judge (then 
Professor) Rogers has pointed out “[O]ver 150 Supreme Court 
cases involving plurality majority opinions indicate that a justice 
should not [aggregate votes by issue and therefore] defer to a 
majority that disagrees on a dispositive issue.”  John M. Rogers, 
“I Vote This Way Because I’m Wrong”: The Supreme Court 
Justice as Epimenides, 79 Ky. L.J. 439, 459 (1990-91). 
 So far as I can ascertain the only support in Supreme 
Court cases for Judge Ambro’s vote which leads to a result on a 
controlling issue in the case different from that which should 
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follow from his view of the case comes from three cases in 
which justices deferred to a majority on an issue that they would 
have resolved differently and therefore provided the decisive 
vote or votes in favor of a judgment that contradicted their own 
reasoning.  See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 313-14, 
111 S.Ct. 1246, 1267 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the 
judgment); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 56-57, 
109 S.Ct. 2273, 2295-96 (1989) (White, J., concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part); United States v. Vuitch, 
402 U.S. 62, 96, 91 S.Ct. 1294, 1311 (1971) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting); id. at 97-98, 91 S.Ct. at 1312 (separate opinion of 
Blackmun, J.).  Significantly, each of the other justices in these 
cases maintained the normal practice of voting for the judgment 
supported by the justice’s own reasoning.  See Hartnett, supra, at 
137; Kornhauser & Sager, supra, at 18-19, 24.  Moreover, the 
justices who gave the “structurally aberrant” votes did not offer 
any explanation for their divergence from accepted practice.  
Kornhauser & Sager, supra, at 2; see Nash, supra, at 84 (noting 
that judges who have employed issue-based voting have “simply 
do[ne] so by fiat”); Rogers, “Issue Voting”, supra, at 998 
(“There was no tenable justification given for the anomalous 
votes in each case . . . .”).  These few deviations, “supported by 
simple ipse dixit, are pretty meager authority compared to the 
overwhelming precedent against” the majority’s approach.  
Rogers, “I Vote This Way Because I’m Wrong”, supra, at 463. 
Judge Ambro explains his use of issue voting and his 
consequent vote that results in an outcome that as an individual 
judge he rejects as a consequence of Judge Fuentes’s and my 
view on “the scope of the law of antitrust standing [which is] 
now the law of this Circuit . . . I am obliged to consider the 
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merits of [3201 Realty’s] suit.”  Id. at 1.  Thus, to Judge Ambro 
the principal of stare decisis applied on an internal basis within a 
case controls the outcome of this appeal even though he does not 
use the term stare decisis in explaining his view of how to 
decide the case.  I believe, however, that this reasoning is 
incorrect.  To start, at the time that Judge Ambro wrote these 
words, and even now, the panel had not yet filed an opinion in 
this case, so Judge Fuentes’s opinion cannot be the law of this 
Circuit.  This point cannot be dismissed as a mere timing 
technicality because the draft opinion must be circulated to all 
the active judges of the Court who then have an opportunity to 
vote for initial en banc consideration of the case before the 
opinion is filed.  3d Cir. I.O.P. 5.5. 
Nor does Judge Ambro’s decision to defer in this case to 
a majority’s view on the standing issue present an apt analogy to 
the application of the principle of stare decisis.  Deferring to a 
majority resolution of an issue within the same case does not 
serve the policies underlying stare decisis, including the 
protection of individuals’ reliance on earlier cases, the need to 
maintain consistency with earlier cases, the judicial efficiency of 
not revisiting issues that already have been decided, and the idea 
that the collective wisdom of courts over the years should 
supersede the limited insights of a court hearing a single case.  
See Rogers, “I Vote This Way Because I’m Wrong”, supra, at 
463-65.  Furthermore, if a judge had an obligation to follow a 
panel majority’s conclusion there never should be a dissent.     
Yet as discussed, rather than following a rule of 
deference to a majority within the same case, judges nearly 
invariably vote for the result supported by their individual 
reasoning, whether the case involves a voting paradox or not.  It 
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is obvious that each instance in which a judge dissents reflects 
an example of a judge declining to defer to a majority view.  
Accordingly, Judge Ambro’s use of the principle of stare decisis 
to support his vote runs “contrary to the overwhelming weight 
of precedent.”  Rogers, “I Vote This Way Because I’m Wrong”, 
supra, at 440.  Such rare and selective deference constitutes little 
deference at all, let alone a proper analogue to the rule of stare 
decisis, which serves very different purposes. 
 I recognize that in voting-paradox cases, outcome voting 
does produce an apparently odd result when compared with the 
outcome that results when a case is decided on the basis of the 
judges’ individual reasoning regarding each underlying issue.  
But, contrary to Judge Ambro’s suggestion, outcome voting 
does not render the precedential value of such cases “unclear.”  
Ambro typescript at 22.  
 Outcoming voting in this case would yield the following 
straightforward body of law for district courts in this Circuit to 
apply: (1) if a case arises that only implicates the standing issue, 
then, if the facts of that case cannot be distinguished from those 
here, the court should hold that the plaintiff has antitrust 
standing based on Judge Fuentes’s and my resolution of that 
issue; (2) if a case arises that implicates the Noerr-Pennington 
issue in a situation that factually cannot be distinguished from 
that in this case, the court should hold that the defendant lacks 
such immunity based on Judge Fuentes’s and Judge Ambro’s 
resolution of that issue; but (3) if a case arises presenting both 
issues, then, again, if the facts of that case cannot be 
distinguished from the facts here, the court should dismiss the 
case.  See, e.g., Greene v. Teffeteller, 90 F. Supp. 387, 388 
(E.D. Tenn. 1950) (applying Supreme Court case that involved 
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voting paradox and emphasizing that “precedent is established 
by the votes of the justices, not by the reasons given for their 
votes.”).  Although no judge would reach all of these three 
conclusions if acting alone, district courts could apply this 
tripartite rule both “easily” and “consistently.”  Rogers, “Issue 
Voting”, supra, at 1013.  Hence, outcome voting would produce 
“clear” guidance to district courts.  Id. at 1009. 
Moreover, issue voting does not offer a panacea to the 
problem of voting paradoxes.  Rather, issue voting raises its own 
set of potential difficulties, including indeterminacy in how to 
identify the relevant issues, the prospect of a judge strategically 
flipping the judgment by dividing an issue into deeper sub-
issues where a majority of the judges agree as to the meta-issue 
but not as to the sub-issues, the possible inability of the court to 
issue a judgment due to cycling in how a majority would prefer 
to resolve the relevant issues, and the thwarting of a majority’s 
view as to the correct judgment.  See Cohen, supra, at 223-24; 
Michael I. Meyerson, The Irrational Supreme Court, 84 Neb. L. 
Rev. 895, 947-49 (2006); Rogers, “Issue Voting”, supra, at 
1002-06; Maxwell L. Stearns, How Outcome Voting Promotes 
Principled Issue Identification: A Reply to Professor John 
Rogers and Others, 49 Vand. L. Rev. 1045, 1063-65 (1996); 
Maxwell L. Stearns, The Misguided Renaissance of Social 
Choice, 103 Yale L.J. 1219, 1267 n.177 (1994).  Thus, even 
proponents of issue voting concede that “there is potential 
incoherence in an issue voting system” as well.  David G. Post 
& Steven C. Salop, Issues and Outcomes, Guidance, and 
Indeterminacy: A Reply to Professor John Rogers and Others, 
49 Vand. L. Rev. 1069, 1083 (1996). 
 The difficulties introduced by issue voting even may 
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undermine the clarity and usability of precedents, the very 
problem that Judge Ambro identifies as a consequence of 
outcome voting.  See Rogers, “Issue Voting”, supra, at 1009-11. 
 After all, just seven years after Justice White employed issue 
voting to change the outcome in Union Gas, the Supreme Court 
overruled that case partly because of the “confusion” it had 
created “among the lower courts that ha[d] sought to understand 
and apply the deeply fractured decision.”  Seminole Tribe of 
Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 64, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 1127 (1996).  
The Court’s about-face can be viewed as “a criticism of the 
practice of vote switching” and may “stand[] for the proposition 
that holdings produced as a result of a vote switch will have 
only limited stare decisis value.”  Maxwell L. Stearns, Should 
Justices Ever Switch Votes?: Miller v. Albright in Social Choice 
Perspective, 7 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 87, 155 (1999).  Problems 
therefore attend to either voting protocol.  “Rather than rail at 
the dilemma wrought by the imperfections of our system [of 
outcome voting], . . . we should recognize that these 
imperfections are simply part of the inherent limitations of 
humanity.”  Meyerson, supra, at 952. 
 To the extent that judges find the voting paradox 
dissatisfying, instead of abandoning the longstanding and 
widespread practice of independent outcome voting, they can 
avoid the paradox by not considering issues after addressing an 
issue that would for them resolve the case.  See id. at 951; Post 
& Salop, Issues and Outcomes, supra, at 1072 (noting that the 
paradox can only occur if “the judges reveal their views on each 
of the underlying issues presented by the case”).  Unlike issue 
voting, the decision not to reach unnecessary questions, even 
when that decision involves not deferring to a majority on an 
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issue and results in a judgment not supported by a single 
majority rationale, has firm roots within our appellate court 
practice.  See, e.g., Cruz, 932 F.2d at 233 (Cowen, J., concurring 
in the judgment only); Lowry v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 707 
F.2d 721, 723 (3d Cir. 1983) (en banc) (per curiam); see also 
Rogers, “I Vote This Way Because I’m Wrong”, supra, at 449 
n.27 (collecting more than two dozen such Supreme Court 
cases).  Indeed, the voting paradox may so seldom appear in 
appellate court opinions because the judges in the majority as to 
outcome “typically do not reveal their views on issues that they 
‘do not need to reach’ in order to vote for” that outcome.  Post & 
Salop, Rowing Against the Tidewater, supra, at 748. 
 Again, it surely is not for me to tell another judge how to 
vote.  Yet I cannot help being aware that there would not be a 
voting paradox here if Judge Ambro had gone no further after 
concluding that the District Court’s dismissal of the complaint 
should be affirmed on the ground that 3201 Realty lacks 
antitrust standing.  There is no doubt that if Judge Ambro had 
followed this approach, we would affirm based on his and my 
independent reasoning.  See Hartnett, supra, at 142-43 (“In 
[Union Gas and Fulminante], not only did the judgment 
ultimately entered fail to reflect how a majority of Justices 
believed the case should have been decided, but worse, 
unnecessary statements in opinions altered the judgment in the 
case. . . . That is not a result we should welcome . . . .”).   
 In fact, if Judge Ambro had gone no further after 
concluding that the District Court’s judgment should be 
affirmed because 3201 Realty lacks antitrust standing, we 
inescapably would affirm regardless of whether we used 
outcome or issue voting.  If we used outcome voting, then two 
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judges, Judge Ambro and I, would be voting to affirm.  If we 
used issue voting, then the vote on the Noerr-Pennington issue 
would have been equally divided, with Judge Fuentes rejecting 
the defense of immunity and with me accepting it.  The 
consequence of that even split is that the District Court’s order 
of dismissal would have been affirmed by an equally divided 
vote.  See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 484, 128 
S.Ct. 2605, 2616 (2008); In re Mkt. Square Inn, Inc., 978 F.2d 
116, 121 (3d Cir. 1992).  Though the District Court did not 
address the Noerr-Pennington issue as it had no need to do so 
because 3201 Realty did not convince the Court that it had 
antitrust standing, still defendants advanced the defense in that 
Court so that the claim of Noerr-Pennington immunity was 
preserved and thus defendants properly could raise it on this 
appeal.  Accordingly, the usual rule that an equally divided 
appellate court leads to an affirmance of the trial court’s 
judgment would apply. 
 Judge Ambro contends that if 3201 Realty had prevailed 
on the standing issue in the District Court and if the defendants 
were not barred from appealing by the final judgment rule and 
had appealed, we would have affirmed on the standing appeal.  
Then if defendants prevailed on the Noerr-Pennington issue in 
the District Court and 3201 Realty appealed we would have 
reversed.  Thus, 3201 Realty would win the case even though a 
majority of the panel thought it should lose.  While Judge 
Ambro may be correct on this point this hypothetical set of facts 
did not happen.   
 Furthermore, a different hypothetical supports the use of 
outcome voting.  Suppose this appeal had been decided by a 
single judge.  If I had been that judge, then the District Court’s 
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order would be affirmed.  If Judge Ambro had been that judge, 
once again the District Court’s order would be affirmed.  Only if 
Judge Fuentes had been that judge, would the District Court’s 
order have been reversed.  I cannot understand why the 
circumstance that we are all on the panel should lead to a 
different result than that which would have been reached 
individually by a majority of the panel. 
 Issue voting “is in considerable tension with the 
traditional emphasis, rooted in Article III, on courts as case 
deciders.”  Hartnett, supra, at 134 n.58.  As has long been true, 
“[t]he question before [us as] an appellate Court is, was the 
judgment correct, not the ground on which the judgment 
professes to proceed.”  McClung v. Silliman, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 
598, 603 (1821).  Although almost two centuries have passed 
since the Supreme Court decided McClung, the law that the 
Court stated there remains good law and no court has better 
expressed the principle that it recognized.  Inasmuch as two of 
the three members of the panel agree that the judgment was 
correct, though for different reasons, surely we are constrained 
to affirm.6  Because the Court does not reach this result and 
because I believe that defendants have a Noerr-Pennington 
defense, I respectfully dissent from the outcome the Court 
reaches even though I agree with Judge Fuentes on his 
resolution of the standing issue. 
 
                                                 
6 In my view, this case can be resolved by making simple 
mathematical calculations that do not require that we use a super 
computer: (1) one and one make two, and (2) two out of three is 
a majority. 
